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Dolan: Misusing Misuse: Why Copyright Misuse Is Unnecessary

MISUSING MISUSE: WHY COPYRIGHT MISUSE
IS UNNECESSARY
By Meg Dolan
I. INTRODUCTION

Consider this: You are a start-up corporation who manufactures
software that does something cool and new. You copyrighted your
software code because it is an original work of authorship, created
as a work for hire, and the creative portions of computer software
programs are copyrightable. You licensed your software to one
company and asked the licensee to agree to forgo any efforts to
independently create its own competitive software, believing in
good faith that this is permissible.2 But another potential licensee
is lurking in the background. Potential licensee hears about this
possibly unfair license you have with licensee. Rather than license
your product, potential licensee simply copies your software. You
sue potential licensee for copyright infringement, but potential
licensee asserts an affirmative defense: copyright misuse. 3 The
court finds that based on your unfair license with licensee, your
copyright is unenforceable.4 In fact, your copyright would be
unenforceable even if the licensee itself had suggested the terms.'
Thus, even though potential licensee is blatantly infringing your
copyright and never entered into an unfair license with you, you
have no recourse. 6 This is the unfortunate side of copyright
1. See 17 U.S.C. § 102 (2000); see also Whelan Assocs., Inc. v. Jaslow
Dental Lab., Inc., 797 F.2d 1222, 1233 (3d Cir. 1986) (discussing the
copyrightability of computer programs).
2. See, e.g., Lasercomb Am., Inc. v. Reynolds, 911 F.2d 970, 971 (4th Cir.
1990) (finding that appellants circumvented the protective devices on appellee's
software after appellee specifically requested otherwise).
3. See infra Part II (detailing copyright misuse).
4. See Lasercomb, 911 F.2d at 979.
5. See Practice Mgmt. Info. Corp. v. Am. Med. Ass'n, 121 F.3d 516, 520-21
(9th Cir. 1997) (discussed infra, noting that which party suggested the
anticompetitve contract terms is irrelevant to the determination of misuse); see
also infra Part III.E (arguing that such contracts should be upheld).
6. Cf Lasercomb, 911 F.2d at 979 (discussed infra, noting that even a party

207
Published by Digital Commons@DePaul, 2016

1

DePaul Journal of Art, Technology & Intellectual Property Law, Vol. 17, Iss. 2 [2016], Art. 2

DEPAUL J. ART& ENT. LAW

[Vol. XVII:207

misuse.7
Misuse is an equitable defense, which developed from the
doctrine of "unclean hands" in response to unfairly competitive
behavior by intellectual property owners. 8 Courts were unhappy
with patentees who, though given a lawful monopoly over their
invention, tried to extend that monopoly to other goods and
processes by means such as tying arrangements and blanket
licenses. Patentees using their intellectual property in this way,
who then had the "audacity" to sue competitors and licensees for
infringement, so angered the courts that they rendered the patents
unenforceable.' Eventually, defendants tried to assert misuse in
0
the copyright context, and courts have more or less condoned it.1
Congress and the courts have backed away from the harshness
of patent misuse over the years,11 yet interestingly, copyright
misuse is seemingly on the rise, at least in scholarly circles, where
its use is often advocated." But as demonstrated by the above
hypothetical, copyright misuse often punishes more than truly
anticompetitive behavior. Further, there are numerous other ways
to address this conduct such as antitrust laws, civil causes of action
to combat harassing litigation, and consumer market forces. It is
not advisable to create another doctrine that provides cumulative
punishment in some cases and punishes the "innocent" in others.
who was not harmed by the anticompetitive terms has standing to claim
misuse); James B. Kobak, Jr., A Sensible Doctrine of Misuse for Intellectual
Property Cases, 2 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 1, 45 (1992) [hereinafter Kobak, A
Sensible Doctrine of Misuse] (noting that copyright misuse may "bar suits
against direct copyists").
7. See infra note 236; cf Kobak, A Sensible Doctrine of Misuse, supra note
6, at 8. Kobak offers this call for caution:
Yet, if the Lasercomb decision is widely accepted, any

restriction that is inserted as a fail-safe to ensure respect for
the copyright, but which goes beyond the prohibition of
copying itself-as any fail-safe provision would have to do if

it were to function as any sort of fail-safe--could be
vulnerable to attack as a misuse.
Id. at 8.
8. See infra notes 20-25 and accompanying text.
9. See infra notes 26-50 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 51-82 and accompanying text.

11. See infra notes 39-50 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 69-82 and accompanying text.
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol17/iss2/2
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This Article addresses the affirmative defense of misuse in the
copyright realm and argues that it is unnecessary. Part II discusses
the development of copyright misuse and its evolution from
"unclean hands" to its application to intellectual property. 3 Next,
Part III argues that misuse is an inappropriate defense for
copyright infringers. 4 It analyzes issues of misplaced incentives,
standing, the subjectivity of the scope of copyright, and the
distinctions between patent and copyright law that make it illogical
to transplant the defense from one area to the other. This Part will
also question whether informed licensees should be permitted to
assert the defense. Part IV proposes alternatives that will alleviate
some of the concerns raised by proponents of copyright misuse.5
It discusses the viability of antitrust law, various tort causes of
action such as abuse of process, fair use, and more generally, using
competitive market forces as a way to address abuses by copyright
owners.
II. BACKGROUND
This Part will trace the evolution of the misuse defense from its
The
equitable roots, to patents, and finally to copyrights.
copyright misuse defense was given significant recognition in
1990 and has continued to gain momentum. 6 Many courts have
recognized it, although few have found in favor of a defendant
trying to assert it.'" This Part will also discuss the scope of the
copyright misuse defense.'" It originated primarily in cases of
antitrust violations, but has extended to cases involving other
examples of overreaching by copyright owners. Finally, the
procedural intricacies of copyright misuse will be considered. 9

13. See infra notes 16-141 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 142-249 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 250-307 and accompanying text.
16. See Lasercomb Am., Inc. v. Reynolds, 911 F.2d 970 (4th Cir. 1990); see
also infra notes 57-68 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 69-82 and accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 82-135 and accompanying text.
19. See infra notes 136-41 and accompanying text.
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A. What is Misuse?
Misuse is an affirmative defense derived from the equitable
doctrine of "unclean hands."20 Unclean hands refers to nefarious
conduct of the plaintiff that makes the court wary of awarding it
any compensation, even if it has truly been harmed. 2' A court,
finding that a plaintiff has unclean hands, will deny relief based on
its behavior so as not to reward the inequitable conduct.22 Thus, an
intellectual property owner whose conduct overreaches the scope
of the grant has unclean hands and should not be allowed to
enforce its right; this specific type of unclean hands was named
misuse. In the intellectual property context, misuse originated in
patent law, but some courts have subsequently extended it to
copyright.23 To date, no courts have recognized a doctrine of
trademark misuse.24 Proponents of misuse argue that it is
importantly distinct from antitrust law in that it extends not only to
unfair competition but also to violations of public policy, and that
it provides no affirmative relief-it functions only as a defense.25
20. David Scher, The Viability of the Copyright Misuse Defense, 20
FORDHAM URB.L.J. 89, 89 (1992).
21. See William M. Corrigan, Jr. & Michael B. Kass, Non-Compete
Agreements and Unfair Competition-An Updated Overview, 62 J. MO. B. 81,
86 (2006) ("There is a well-known adage that for one to seek equity, he must do
equity.").
22. See, e.g., U.S. v. Felici, 208 F.3d 667, 670-71 (8th Cir. 2000) ("The
doctrine of unclean hands is an equitable doctrine that allows a court to withhold
equitable relief if such relief would encourage or reward illegal activity.").
23. See, e.g., Morton Salt Co. v. G.S. Suppiger, Co., 314 U.S. 488 (1942);
Lasercomb Am., Inc. v. Reynolds, 911 F.2d 970 (4th Cir. 1990).
24. G. Gervaise Davis III, The Affirmative Defense of Copyright Misuse and
Efforts to Establish Trademark Misuse and Fraud on the Copyright Office:
Establishing Limitations on the Scope of Copyright Owners Rights Based on
Several Theories, 867 PLI/Pat 103, 148-49 (2006).
25. See, e.g., Elec. Data Sys. Corp. v. Computer Assocs. Int'l, Inc., 802 F.
Supp. 1463 (N.D. Tex. 1992); see also Scher, supra note 20, at 97-104 (arguing
that misuse should exist independently of antitrust law). Scher justifies his
contention by pointing out that antitrust is a counterclaim while misuse is an
affirmative defense. Thus, a defendant need not be personally injured to assert a
misuse claim. Id. at 97. 1 discuss the intersection of antitrust and misuse more
below, and argue that these are simply procedural aspects that present almost a
circular argument as to why antitrust law is important. See infra notes 254-271
and accompanying text.
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1. Patents
The misuse defense originated in patent law as a doctrine
created by courts of equity. Initially, courts seemed willing to give
patentees wide latitude in protecting their exclusive monopolies.
For example, in Henry v. A.B. Dick Co., the Court sustained the
tying of a patentee's patented mimeograph machine to unpatented
The Court rejected the argument that allowing this
ink.26
arrangement extended the patentee's monopoly beyond the scope
of the patent grant.27 It noted that because the machine was
patented, no one could have used a different ink in the machine
without infringing the machine patent itself.28 Thus, the patentee
"took nothing from others and in no way restricted their legitimate
29
market.
The Court swung the pendulum back in the other direction and
fully recognized patent misuse for the first time in Morton Salt Co.
v. G.S. Suppiger, Co.3" There, the plaintiff patentee patented a salt
deposition machine. 1 The plaintiff also sold unpatented salt
tablets for use in the machine.32 To increase its sales of salt tablets,
the plaintiff required licensees of its patented machine to buy its
unpatented tablets as well. 3 It brought suit against the defendant
for allegedly infringing its patented machine and the defendant
claimed the plaintiff had unclean hands.34 The defendant pointed
26. Henry v. A.B. Dick Co., 224 U.S. 1, 25 (1912). The patentee licensed his
machine, but in return, he required that licensees use only his brand of ink,
stencil paper, and other supplies. Id. at 11. The defendant sold a can of his own
brand of ink with the knowledge that it was going to be used in the patented
machine and with knowledge of the license's restrictions. Id. at 11-12. The
defendant was sued for contributory infringement and in response argued that
the plaintiff was misusing his patent (although the defendant did not use that
exact terminology). Id. at 14.
27. Id. at 32-33.
28. Id. at 32.
29. Id. at 33.
30. Morton Salt Co. v. G.S. Suppiger, Co., 314 U.S. 488 (1942).
31. Id. at 489. A salt deposition machine was "a device said to be useful in
the canning industry for adding predetermined amounts of salt in tablet form to
the contents of the cans." Id.
32. Id. at 490.
33. Id.
34. Id. The trial court had dismissed the complaint because it felt the
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to the tying arrangement as evidence of unfair competition.35 The
Court noted that the policy behind giving a patentee an exclusive
monopoly for a limited time also "forbids the use of the patent to
secure an exclusive right or limited monopoly not granted by the
Patent Office and which it is contrary to public policy to grant."36
Even though this particular defendant might not have been
affected, the court noted "[ilt is the adverse effect upon the public
interest of a successful infringement suit in conjunction with the
patentee's course of conduct which disqualifies him to maintain
the suit, regardless of whether the particular defendant has suffered
from the misuse of the patent."37 Thus, the Court refused to grant
relief to a patentee who was attempting to obtain a monopoly
above and beyond that granted by the patent itself.38
Plaintiffs, defendants, and the courts continued their tug of war
over patent misuse. In 1952, Congress attempted to take back for
the patentee some of the area the courts had taken away through
the application of misuse. Congress codified the misuse doctrine
plaintiff-patentee was restraining competition. Id. at 489-90. The Seventh
Circuit reversed because there was no violation of the Clayton Act. Id. at 490.
35. Morton Salt, 314 U.S. at 489-90.
36. Id. at 492. The Court added that "the use of [the patent] to suppress
competition in the sale of an unpatented article may deprive the patentee of the
aid of a court of equity to restrain an alleged infringement by one who is a
competitor." Id. at 491.
37. Id. at 494 (emphasis added); see also James B. Kobak, Jr., The Misuse
Defense and Intellectual Property Litigation, 1 B.U. J. SCi. & TECH. L. 2, 7
(1995) [hereinafter Kobak, The Misuse Defense] (noting that the defendant in
Morton Salt obtained summary judgment in the lower court even though it did
not prove "any of the traditional elements of an antitrust claim: market power,
effect on the market, or injury to himself"); Scher, supra note 20, at 94
(discussing Morton Salt and noting that the Court thought that "the public in
general suffers if an individual claims exclusive rights over something he did
not create, because that individual removes from the public that which does not
belong to him"). Later cases supported this view of patent misuse. See, e.g.,
Mercoid Corp. v. Minneapolis-Honeywell Regulator Co., 320 U.S. 680 (1944);
Mercoid Corp. v. Mid-Continent Inv. Co., 320 U.S. 661 (1944); see also Kobak,
The Misuse Defense, supra note 37, at 6 (discussing the Court's use of
"sweeping language" to limit patentees' rights in the Mercoid cases).
38. Cf Karen E. Georgenson, Comment, Reverse Engineering of
Copyrighted Software: Fair Use or Misuse?, 5 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 291, 314
(1996) (explaining that the Court refused to find infringement because the
patentee was violating public policy).
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol17/iss2/2
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and gave specific examples of behavior that does not constitute
patent misuse; the statute allowed the patentee to negotiate licenses
involving conduct that would otherwise be contributory
infringement and solidified the right to bring suit to enforce one's
patent rights. 9
Dawson Chemical Co. v. Rohm & Haas Co. added another
limitation to the patent misuse doctrine. " There, the patentee held
a process patent on the use of propanil as a herbicide in rice
farming.4
The defendant was accused of contributory
infringement for selling propanil in a container labeled with
directions for its use as a herbicide-the patented process. " The
defendant argued that because propanil itself was not patented, the
plaintiff was illegally extending its process patent grant by limiting
the sale of propanil.43 But the court found that the plaintiff had not
misused its patent by using it to effectively control the market for
propanil, because it was a nonstaple article with no significant
noninfringing uses.44 Thus, the court allowed the patentee to
39. The original version of the statute provides:
(d) No patent owner otherwise entitled to relief for
infringement or contributory infringement of a patent shall be
denied relief or deemed guilty of misuse or illegal extension
of the patent right by reason of his having done one or more of
the following:
(1)derived revenue from acts which if performed by
another without his consent would constitute
contributory infringement of the patent;
(2)licensed or authorized another to perform acts
which if performed without his consent would
constitute contributory infringement of the patent;
(3)sought to enforce his patent rights against
infringement or contributory infringement.
35 U.S.C. § 271(d) (1952).
40. Dawson Chem. Co. v. Rohm & Haas Co., 448 U.S. 176 (1980).
41. Id. at 181.
42. Id. at 183.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 201. The Court explained the reasoning for its decision:
In this instance, as we have already stated, Congress chose a
compromise between competing policy interests. The policy
of free competition runs deep in our law. It underlies both the
doctrine of patent misuse and the general principle that the
boundary of a patent monopoly is to be limited by the literal
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regulate the sale of a nonstaple product beyond the scope of its
patent grant.45 This seemingly expanded the rights of patentees.
Congress further narrowed the defense in 1988 by adding
additional examples of conduct that does not constitute patent
misuse. 46 Thus, courts and legislators seem to be consistently
constricting the use of patent misuse as an affirmative defense.47
Indeed, prior to the 1988 amendments, numerous congressional
bills called for the complete abolishment of patent misuse.
Further, the statutory amendments provide that without a showing
scope of the patent claims. But the policy of stimulating
invention that underlies the entire patent system runs no less
deep. And the doctrine of contributory infringement, which
has been called "an expression both of law and morals," can
be of crucial importance in ensuring that the endeavors and
investments of the inventor do not go unrewarded.
Id. at 221 (citations omitted).
45. See Kobak, A Sensible Doctrine of Misuse, supra note 6, at 45-46 (noting
that per Dawson Chem., patentees can tie nonstaple articles without having to
show any "special justification"). In his call for an adjusted misuse doctrine,
Kobak further argues that parties "accused of misuse should also be permitted to
defend the use of a tie-in . . . by showing that it is necessary to achieve
legitimate reward and expansion of output." Id. at 45.
46. The amendments added these items to the list of conduct that does not
constitute misuse:
(4)refused to license or use any rights to the patent; or
(5)conditioned the license of any rights to the patent or the
sale of the patented product on the acquisition of a license to
rights in another patent or purchase of a separate product,
unless, in view of the circumstances, the patent owner has
market power in the relevant market for the patent or patented
product on which the license or sale is conditioned.
35 U.S.C. § 27 1(d) (1988); accord Kobak, A Sensible Doctrine of Misuse, supra
note 6, at 23 (discussing the 1988 amendments and noting that before the
amendments, "[p]atentees chafed for years under the harshness and uncertainty
of the misuse doctrine").
47. See Dawson Chem., 448 U.S. at 194 ("Although none of these decisions
purported to cut back on the doctrine of contributory infringement itself, they
were generally perceived as having that effect, and how far the developing
doctrine of patent misuse might extend was a topic of some speculation among
members of the patent bar."); Kobak, The Misuse Defense, supra note 37, at 711 (noting that some commentators called for the rejection of patent misuse
altogether and that others argued it provided a "windfall for patent infringers").
48. Kobak, A Sensible Doctrine of Misuse, supra note 6, at 23.
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of market power, a patentee may continue using tying
arrangements for staple and nonstaple articles, thus giving the
patentee broad rights.49 But while patent misuse is narrowing,
copyright misuse is seemingly on the rise."
2. Courts Adopt Misusefor Copyrights

a. The Early Years
In 1948, one court lifted the misuse defense from the world of
patents, and applied it to copyrights. Despite important differences
in these two types of intellectual property,5 a Minnesota district
court saw an opportunity to punish a copyright holder for what it
believed was anticompetitive behavior. 2 In M. Witmark & Sons v.
Jensen, the owner of copyrights on music used in films required
theater owners to obtain blanket licenses of numerous musical
compositions, in addition to the film licenses, before showing the
movies. 3 The court agreed with the defendants that the plaintiffs
were using their copyrights on the music (which they had licensed
to the film producers) to get monopolies on the films as well." If
the plaintiffs desired, they could refuse to license the music to
theater owners, thereby preventing the theaters from showing the
movies over which the plaintiffs owned no copyrights.5 Although
not calling it misuse, the court refused to find the defendants liable
for infringement due to the plaintiff's "unclean hands"-here, the
extension of its copyrights. 6
49. Id. at 24.
50. See Victoria Smith Ekstrand, Protecting the Public Policy Rationale of
Copyright: Reconsidering Copyright Misuse, 11 COMM. L. & POL'Y 565, 587

(2006) (analyzing various cases and offering the hope that the pendulum is
swinging back in favor of defendants).
51. See infra Part III.D.
52. M. Witmark & Sons v. Jensen, 80 F. Supp. 843 (D. Minn. 1948).
53. Id. at 844-45.
54. Id. at 849-50.
55. Id. at 846.
56. Id. at 850. The Court noted "'[i]t is a principle of general application that
courts, and especially courts of equity, may appropriately withhold their aid
where the plaintiff is using the right asserted contrary to the public interest."'
Published by Digital Commons@DePaul, 2016

9

DePaul Journal of Art, Technology & Intellectual Property Law, Vol. 17, Iss. 2 [2016], Art. 2

DEPAULJ.ART& ENT. LAW

[Vol. XVII:207

b. Lasercomb
Between 1948 and 1990, various courts discussed misuse, but
the defense was not widely accepted. 7 However, in 1990, in
Lasercomb America, Inc. v. Reynolds,58 the Fourth Circuit revived
the copyright misuse defense. The plaintiff, Lasercomb, created
and copyrighted a software program for use in the steel die

Id. (quoting Morton Salt Co. v. G.S. Suppiger Co., 314 U.S. 488, 492 (1942)).
57. See Broad. Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 24
(1979) (assuming that reversal of antitrust claims necessitated reversing the
"copyright misuse judgment dependent upon it"); United Tel. Co. of Mo. v.
Johnson Publ'g Co., 855 F.2d 604, 612 (8th Cir. 1988) (assuming arguendo that
copyright misuse might be a viable affirmative defense, but holding it
inapplicable in the current case); Supermarket of Homes, Inc. v. San Fernando
Valley Bd. of Realtors, 786 F.2d 1400, 1408 (9th Cir. 1986) (recognizing that
using a copyright to defraud the public might constitute misuse but finding
insufficient facts in the case at bar to support a finding of misuse); F.E.L.
Publ'ns Ltd. v. Catholic Bishop of Chi., No. 81-1333, 1982 WL 19198, at *5 n.9
(7th Cir. Mar. 25, 1982) ("Dismissal of a copyright claim for misuse is an
equitable defense which requires a balancing of equities. We think that in this
case, the scales are tipped in [the copyright owner's] favor."); Edward B. Marks
Music Corp. v. Colo. Magnetics, Inc., 497 F.2d 285, 291 (10th Cir. 1974)
(finding no misuse and noting "[a]s the defendants' piracy is unmistakably
clear, while the plaintiffs' infraction of the anti-trust laws is doubtful and at
most marginal, we think the enforcement of the first policy should outweigh
enforcement of the second." (quoting Alfred Bell & Co. v. Catalda Fine Arts,
Inc., 191 F.2d 99 (2d Cir. 1991))); Hutchinson Tel. Co. v. Fronteer Directory
Co. of Minn., 640 F. Supp. 386, 391 (D. Minn. 1986) (conflating a claim for
misuse into a claim for antitrust violations and finding those violations
unproven); Broad. Music, Inc. v. Niro's Palace, Inc., 619 F. Supp. 958, 963
(N.D. Ill. 1985) (finding insufficient facts to support a claim for copyright
misuse in the context of a blanket license to a bowling alley); Peter Pan Fabrics,
Inc. v. Candy Frocks, Inc., 187 F. Supp. 334, 336 (S.D.N.Y. 1960) (refusing to
recognize misuse and noting "[i]f, indeed, plaintiffs had violated the antitrust
laws by their trade practices, which the court does not find to be true, in this
case it would not be a defense to an action for copyright infringement");
Greenbie v. Noble, 151 F. Supp. 45, 62 (S.D.N.Y. 1957) ("Consequently, it
cannot be said that plaintiff used her copyright as a means of extending it
beyond its proper scope or that she did in fact enlarge the copyright monopoly
so as to embrace features not covered by the copyright."); see also Kobak, A
Sensible Doctrineof Misuse, supra note 6, at 24.
58. Lasercomb Am., Inc. v. Reynolds, 911 F.2d 970 (4th Cir. 1990).
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol17/iss2/2
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industry.59 It licensed the program to a competitor who promptly
circumvented the technological protection measures that were in
The
place and created its own version of the software.6"
competitor went beyond simply copying the software and also
removed the firewall protection, yet fraudulently told Lasercomb it
was still in place.61
The licensees in Lasercomb did not dispute that they had
"engaged in unauthorized copying" and "deceptive practices."62
Yet the licensees raised copyright misuse as an affirmative
defense, pointing to a restrictive provision in the license where
Lasercomb forbade its licensees from creating competing software,
even software that would not infringe its copyright.63 Interestingly,
the licensees in the current case had never actually signed the
license and thus were not restricted by its terms. 64
The Fourth Circuit first clarified that indeed, the copyright
misuse defense exists and then traced its origins from patent law.65
The court noted, however, that until that time, only one court had
found a violation of copyright misuse-in M. Witmark & Sonsand that some uncertainty existed among the circuits given the lack
of the Supreme Court's stamp of approval.6 6 The court went on to
explain that a defendant claiming misuse need not meet the high
burden of proving an antitrust violation, but need only to show the
conduct that violated the spirit of the copyright grant. 67 The court
further opined that although the defendants themselves were not
subject to the illegal license, they could still assert-and win-the
copyright misuse claim. 68 This created the anomaly that even a

59. Id. at 971.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 971-72.
62. Id. at 971.
63. Id. at 972.
64. Lasercomb, 911 F.2d at 973. The defendants did show that at least one
licensee had signed the contract and entered into the unfair license. Id.; see also
Carole Jeffery, Copyright Misuse: A Defense Whose Time Has Come?, 27
COLO. LAW. 143, 143 (1998).
65. Lasercomb, 911 F.2d at 973.
66. Id. at 976 (citing M. Witmark & Sons v. Jensen, 80 F. Supp. 843 (D.
Minn. 1948)).
67. Id. at 977.
68. Id. at 979.
Published by Digital Commons@DePaul, 2016
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party who was not harmed by the license had standing to allege
misuse. Thus, plaintiff Lasercomb was unable to sue anyone for
copyright infringement during the period its anticompetitive
licenses were in use.
c. CopyrightMisuse Catches On... Or Does It?
After Lasercomb, courts were more receptive to the possibility,
if not the finding, of copyright misuse.69 Indeed, while more and
more courts pay lip service to the existence of copyright misuse,
they rarely sustain a claim for it.7" Initially, courts seemed hesitant
to create a new body of law where antitrust already provided a
remedy. In Saturday Evening Post Co. v. Rumbleseat Press, Inc.,
the Seventh Circuit noted that examining clauses for arguable
restraint of trade was best done through the antitrust laws.7 Other
cases explicitly questioned whether copyright misuse was a
defense, and if it was, whether it would necessarily rely on patent
misuse for procedural and substantive characteristics.72
69. See Ekstrand, supra note 50, at 586-87 (reporting that courts rarely find
for the defendant on misuse claims and that the doctrine is analyzed narrowly to
include primarily antitrust violations).
70. See Ralph D. Clifford, Simultaneous Copyright and Trade Secret Claims:
Can the Copyright Misuse Defense Prevent Constitutional Doublethink?, 104
DICK. L. REV. 247, 262 (2000) ("Of the cases recognizing the existence of the
copyright misuse defense, only a minority have found that misuse was factually
established at trial."); Ekstrand, supra note 50, at 569 (noting that four circuits
have recognized copyright misuse).
71. Saturday Evening Post Co. v. Rumbleseat Press, Inc., 816 F.2d 1191,
1200 (7th Cir. 1987). At least at that point in time, Judge Poser was skeptical of
copyright misuse claims outside antitrust:
"If misuse claims are not tested by conventional antitrust
principles, by what principles shall they be tested? Our law is
not rich in alternative concepts of monopolistic abuse; and it
is rather late in the date to try to develop one without in the
process subjecting the rights of patent holders to debilitating
uncertainty." This point applies with even greater force to
copyright misuse, where the danger of monopoly is less.
Id. (quoting USM Corp. v. SPS Techs., 694 F.2d 505, 512 (7th Cir. 1982)).
72. See Reed-Union Corp. v. Turtle Wax, Inc., 77 F.3d 909, 913 (7th Cir.
1996) (questioning whether copyright misuse was a viable defense in that circuit
and noting that patents are generally more valuable than copyrights because they
exclude all competition, whether independently created or copied).
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol17/iss2/2
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Gradually, some circuits began accepting copyright misuse. The
Ninth Circuit explicitly recognized it in Practice Management
Information Corp. v. American Medical Ass 'n.73 There, the AMA
created a coding system for medical procedures for use in
completing insurance forms. 74 The AMA licensed its system to a
third party and included in the license a clause that forbade it from
using competitors' products.7" The defendant, a potential licensee
who failed to get the deal it desired, sued the AMA, citing the third
party's license.76 The court found that because the AMA entered
into an anticompetitive license with someone, even though that
someone was not the defendant, its copyright was unenforceable
for the period that the license was in place.77 Amazingly, the third
party licensee, not the copyright holder, suggested the
anticompetitive clause, but the court held this was irrelevant and
that the license "gave the AMA a substantial and unfair advantage
over its competitors."78
The Seventh Circuit has approvingly discussed misuse, but has
held a high bar for proving it. In Ty, Inc. v. Publications
InternationalLtd., the court hinted that asserting editorial control
over a licensee to prevent criticisms protected by the First
Amendment might flirt with copyright misuse. 79 Further, in
Assessment Technologies of Wisconsin, LLC v. WIREdata, Inc., the
Seventh Circuit spoke generally about the existence of a misuse
defense, but noted that in the case at bar, there were insufficient
facts to require "run[ning] that hare to the ground."" ° Similarly,
73. Practice Mgmt. Info. Corp. v. Am. Med. Ass'n, 121 F.3d 516 (9th Cir.
1997).
74. Id. at 517.
75. Id. at 517-18.
76. Id. at 518.
77. Id. at 521.
78. Id.
79. Ty, Inc. v. Publ'ns Int'l Ltd., 292 F.3d 512, 520 (2002) (discussed more
fully infra notes 112-17).
80. Assessment Techs. of Wis., LLC v. WIREdata, Inc., 350 F.3d 640, 647
(7th Cir. 2003). In WIREdata, the plaintiff copyright holder created a database
and held a copyright in the compilation. Id. at 642. The defendant tried to
obtain the individual records but could not do so without allegedly infringing
the compilation. Id. The court avoided the misuse question and held, ala Feist,
that because the plaintiff did not have a copyright in the underlying data, it was
possible for the defendant to extract the data without infringing the copyrighted
Published by Digital Commons@DePaul, 2016
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other circuits have recognized the defense in the abstract, but
failed to find it based on the facts presented. 8 Notably, the
82
Supreme Court has never explicitly recognized copyright misuse.
B. When Does Copyright Misuse Apply?
There has been much debate and uncertainty amongst the
circuits regarding whether and how copyright misuse should apply.
Some courts see misuse as parallel to antitrust claims, and thus
require defendants to reach that level of anticompetitive behavior.83
Others extend the misuse defense to situations where the copyright
owner's behavior violates some policy inherent in copyright law.84
Of course, this has created confusion over what those polices are
and how one might violate them.
1. Antitrust
Since its early Lasercomb days, copyright misuse, drawing from
patent misuse, has been regarded as applying where a copyright
owner has engaged in behavior that violates the antitrust laws.85
To prove an antitrust violation, the defendant must show: "1) a
pattern of conduct by plaintiff in restraint of trade, and 2) that this
arrangement. Id. at 644, 647.
81. See, e.g., Telecom Technical Servs. Inc. v. Rolm Co., 388 F.3d 820, 831
(11 th Cir. 2004) ("Even if [the defense of copyright misuse] exists, it would not
help the [defendants] because we conclude that Siemens's actions do not violate
intellectual property or antitrust law."); Dun & Bradstreet Software Servs., Inc.
v. Grace Consulting, Inc., 307 F.3d 197, 221 (3d Cir. 2002) (reserving the
acceptance of copyright misuse for "another case"); Video Pipeline, Inc. v.
Buena Vista Home Entm't, Inc., 342 F.3d 191, 206 (3d Cir. 2001) (accepting
copyright misuse as a defense in theory, but finding it did not exist in that case).
82. But see United States v. Loew's, Inc., 371 U.S. 38, 50 (1962) ("The
principles underlying our ParamountPicturesdecision have general application
to tying arrangements involving copyrighted products."). The Paramount
Pictures decision upheld the finding of an antitrust violation for a blanket
license of copyrighted works. See United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc.,
334 U.S. 131 (1948).
83. See infra notes 85-104 and accompanying text.
84. See infra notes 105-135 and accompanying text.
85. See Lasercomb Am., Inc. v. Reynolds, 911 F.2d. 970, 978 (4th Cir.
1990).
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol17/iss2/2

14

Dolan: Misusing Misuse: Why Copyright Misuse Is Unnecessary

MISUSING MISUSE

2007]

restraint is unreasonable."86 This is typically a fairly high burden. 7
Many antitrust-style or anticompetitive situations can be
categorized into a few main types. These constitute situations
where courts will likely find copyright misuse. Of course, some of
this conduct does not fully rise to the level of an antitrust
violation-but courts consider it as effectively anticompetitive
behavior in that it violates the "spirit of the law."
a. Tying
Tying refers to allowing the license or sale of a copyrighted
product only on the condition that some public domain work is
also purchased or licensed.8 In Morton Salt, an arrangement tying
a patented machine to unpatented parts led the court to find a per
se case of patent misuse.89 In Service & Training, Inc. v. Data
General Corp., the Fourth Circuit addressed a claim of tying and
misuse in the copyright realm.9 ° There, the defendant claimed that
the plaintiff required any purchase of its copyrighted software to
be accompanied by the purchase of its support services.9
Ultimately the defendant's case failed because of an evidentiary
problem-it could not show any explicit agreement tying the
products.92 It seems likely, however, that where a court finds a
86. Scher, supra note 20, at 97.
87. See id. at 97-98 (calling the burden of proof required for misuse-as
compared to that required for antirust claims-"much easier").
88. See Serv. & Training, Inc. v. Data Gen. Corp., 963 F.2d 680, 683 (4th
Cir. 1992). The court recited the requirements of a tying claim:
To establish a per se tying claim under section 1 [of the
Sherman Act], a plaintiff must prove (1) the existence of two
separate products, (2) an agreement conditioning purchase of
the tying product upon purchase of the tied product (or at least
upon an agreement not to purchase the tied product from
another party), (3) the seller's possession of sufficient
economic power in the tying product market to restrain
competition in the tied product market, and (4) a not
insubstantial impact on interstate commerce.
Id. (citations omitted).
89. Morton Salt Co. v. G.S. Suppiger, Co., 314 U.S. 488 (1942).
90. Data Gen. Corp., 963 F.2d at 680.

91. Id. at 683.
92. Id. at 686-87.
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tying arrangement that violates the Sherman Act, it will probably
also find copyright misuse.93
b. Blanket Licensing
A blanket license forces a licensee to purchase rights not only to
the desired copyrighted works, but also to less desirable works, or
even to works in the public domain.94 For example, in F.E.L.
Publications Ltd. v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, the plaintiff
owned copyrights on various liturgical hymns that it licensed to
churches.95 The plaintiff brought suit alleging that the Catholic
Church in Chicago was publishing and distributing infringing

copies of its songs.96 The defendant Church sought summary
judgment for copyright misuse because the plaintiff required a
lump sum purchase of all 1400 of its songs, even if a licensee
wanted only a few "blockbusters."97 The court sustained the claim
of misuse based on the blanket license (this was reversed on this
claim).98 The Supreme Court has also held that blanket licenses in
the copyright context are violative of antitrust, if not specifically
copyright misuse.99

93. In patent law, tying constitutes misuse only if the patentee has market
power in the item. See 35 U.S.C. § 271(d) (2000); Kobak, A Sensible Doctrine
of Misuse, supra note 6, at 45-46 (discussing the requirement of market power
and noting that copyright law currently has no such requirements); cf Scher,
supra note 20, at 105 (proposing a new test for copyright misuse and arguing
that any tying of an uncopyrighted work to a copyrighted work would constitute
misuse).
94. See Michael J. Meurer, Vertical Restraints and Intellectual Property
Law: Beyond Antitrust, 87 MiNN. L. REv. 1871, 1904-05 (2003) (discussing
such blanket licenses or "packaging" agreements which force licensees to "take
a package of products or licenses"). Professor Meurer notes that "mandatory
packages are profitable because they reduce enforcement or other transaction
costs, or because they implement price discrimination." Id. at 1904.
95. F.E.L. Publ'ns Ltd. v. Catholic Bishop of Chi., 506 F. Supp. 1127 (N.D.
I11.
1981).
96. Id. at 1129.
97. Id. at 1132.
98. Id.
99. See United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131 (1948).
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol17/iss2/2
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c. Tie-outs
Some companies have formulated licenses that prohibit
licensees from using competitors' products-tie-outs. As noted
above, in PracticeManagement, the court found misuse where the
AMA included a clause in its license barring the licensee from
using any other coding processes. °° The court was not persuaded
by the AMA's arguments that the defendant was not a party to
such a license,"0 nor that the AMA had not even suggested the
license terms at issue.'0 2 Courts consider this prohibition on using
competitors' products to be misuse.
Lasercomb, also discussed above, involved a similar kind of tieout. There, the licensor prohibited the licensee from creating its
own competing product, even using independent creation
methods.0 3 The court found this behavior a misuse of copyright
because it unfairly restrained competition."° It is interesting to
note that Practice Management and Lasercomb are some of the
only cases where the court actually found misuse by the copyright
owner. While the other categories of potential misuse have
generated implicit approval from courts, most never amount to an
actual misuse. Thus, tie-outs seem to be the most certain situation
where a court will find that copyright misuse exists.
2. The PoliciesBehind Copyright
While courts initially focused on antitrust violations as
indicative of copyright misuse, some latched on to the equitable
roots of misuse and found that it includes conduct that violates the
policies behind the scope of the copyright grant. In Lasercomb,
the Fourth Circuit broadened the defense:

100. Practice Mgmt. Info. Corp. v. Am. Med. Ass'n, 121 F.3d 516, 521 (9th
Cir. 1997).
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Lasercomb Am., Inc. v. Reynolds, 911 F.2d 970, 978 (4th Cir. 1990)
(reporting that the license "essentially attempts to suppress any attempt by the
licensee to independently implement the idea which [the licensed software]
expresses").
104. Id. at 979.
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So while it is true that the attempted use of a
copyright to violate antitrust law probably would
give rise to a misuse of copyright defense, the
converse is not necessarily true-a misuse need not
be a violation of antitrust law in order to comprise
an equitable defense to an infringement action. The
question is not whether the copyright is being used
in a manner violative of antitrust law (such as
whether the licensing agreement is 'reasonable'),
but whether the copyright is being used in a manner
violative of the public policy embodied in the grant
of a copyright.° 5
Thus, the Lasercomb court opened the door to speculation about
the nature and scope of these public policies behind copyright
grants. 06
'
Other courts have adopted this expanded view of misuse. In
qad, inc. v. ALN Associates, Inc., the copyright holder fraudulently
obtained a copyright over software that it had partially copied from
another work.0 7 It then used that copyright as grounds to sue a
competitor for infringement and successfully preliminarily
enjoined the competitor from selling its product.'
The court
found this was an "egregious" misuse and held the plaintiffs
copyright unenforceable.' °9
The misuse stemmed from the
fraudulent use of a copyright to gain control over works in which it
had no rights."0 Thus, the plaintiffs conduct went beyond the
scope of its copyright and the court held that it violated the policy

105. Id. at 978.
106. Cf Shubha Ghosh, When Exclusionary Conduct Meets the Exclusive
Rights of Intellectual Property: Morris v. PGA Tour and the Limits of Free
Riding as an Antirust Business Justification, 37 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 723, 750
(2006) (criticizing copyright holders who complain about "free riding" as
"disguis[ing] the question of entitlement and assum[ing] that the creator is
entitled to completely appropriate the value of what she has created").
107. qad, inc. v. ALN Assocs., Inc., 770 F. Supp. 1261, 1266 (N.D. Ill.
1991).
108. Id. at 1270.
109. Id. at 1267.
110. Id.
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol17/iss2/2
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of promoting the progress of science."' That is, when the plaintiff
used its copyright to force another author to cease creating even
though it had no such rights, it lost the ability to enforce its
copyright.
Another situation that potentially violates a copyright policy is
where a copyright holder attempts to assert editorial control over
criticisms of its work. In Ty, Inc., Judge Posner examined the
issue of collectors' guides."12 The plaintiff held a copyright on
some plush toys as sculptural works, and thus contended that the
photographs of the toys in unauthorized collectors' guides were
infringing derivative works." 3 The court drew attention to the
plaintiffs practice of granting licenses for such collectors' guides
only to licensees who gave the plaintiff final editorial control." 4
The licenses also required the licensee to include blatantly
fraudulent material in its guides such as denying they were
licensees and stating that the plaintiff had no editorial control." 5
While misuse did not officially play a role in the decision, the
court toyed with the idea, noting, "[w]e need not consider whether
such a misleading statement might constitute copyright misuse,
endangering [the plaintiffs] copyrights.""' 6 The court reminded
the parties that fair use protects criticisms of copyrighted works." 7
Similarly, in Video Pipeline, Inc., v. Buena Vista Home
Entertainment, Inc., the court considered whether Disney's use of
licenses that prohibited licensees from making critical comments
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.

Id. at 1270.
Ty, Inc. v. Publ'ns Int'l, Ltd., 292 F.3d 512 (7th Cir. 2002).
Id. at515.
Id. at 520.
Id. The court discussed Ty's conduct:
Ty doesn't like criticism, and so the copyright licenses that it
grants to those publishers whom it is willing to allow to
publish Beanie Baby collectors' guides reserve to it the right
to veto any text in the publishers' guides. It also forbids
licensees to reveal that they are licensees of Ty. Its standard
licensing agreement requires the licensee to print on the title
page and back cover of its publication the following
misleading statement: "This publication is not sponsored or
endorsed by, or otherwise affiliated with Ty, Inc."

Id.
116. Id. at 520.
117. Id.
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about Disney on their websites was copyright misuse." 8 However,
the Third Circuit ultimately held that while the First Amendment
protected criticism, prohibiting such criticism only on one
particular website was not misuse." 9 Thus, whether trying to
override fair use and free speech policies constitutes misuse
20
remains an open question.
Other copyright holders have been accused of trying to
monopolize areas outside the scope of their copyright using the
Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA). 12 ' The DMCA was
enacted in 2001 to prohibit the unauthorized circumvention of
digital controls used to protect a copyrighted work.' 22 The DMCA
was aimed at protecting content providers like movie studios, who
of their digitally
were having difficulty preventing piracy
1 23
encrypted works such as DVDs and CDs.
Another set of copyright holders, those copyrighting software
programs used inside products like printer cartridges and garage
118. Video Pipeline, Inc., v. Buena Vista Home Entm't, Inc., 342 F.3d 191
(3d Cir. 2003). Disney included this language in its licenses for movie trailers:
The Website in which the Trailers are used may not be
derogatory to or critical of the entertainment industry or of
[Disney] (and its officers, directors, agents, employees,
affiliates, divisions and subsidiaries) or of any motion picture
produced or distributed by [Disney] .

.

. [or] of the materials

from which the Trailers were taken or of any person involved
with the production of the Underlying Works. Any breach of
this paragraph will render this license null and void and
Licensee will be liable to all parties concerned for defamation
and copyright infringement, as well as breach of contract.
Id. at 203 (alterations in original).
119. Id. at 206. The court was convinced that the licensees could use other
venues to express their dislike of Disney or could probably even criticize Disney
without violating the copyright by asserting the defense of fair use. See id.
120. Cf JuNelle Harris, Beyond Fair Use: Expanding Copyright Misuse to
Protect Free Speech, 13 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 83, 109 (2004) ("Thus, while
its contours remain at present uncertain as a limiting doctrine, copyright misuse
has the potential to protect important First Amendment interests that are
underserved by current fair use analysis.").
121. 17 U.S.C. § 1201 (2000).
122. Id.; see also Marcus Howell, The Misapplication of the DMCA to the
Aflermarket, 11 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 128, 129 (2005).
123. See, e.g., Universal City Studios v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429, 436 (2d Cir.
2001).
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol17/iss2/2
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door openers, tried to assert DMCA claims against competitors
who circumvented the technological protections encrypting the
software programs in order to create interoperable replacement
parts.12 These plaintiff companies argued that the DMCA created
a cause of action beyond mere infringement, adding a right of
access to the copyright owner's bundle of rights.'25 Thus, they
argued that they were not attempting to expand their copyrights,
but were instead trying to take advantage of a right bestowed on
them, and on other copyright holders, by Congress.

26

Both

appellate courts who reviewed such claims rejected them, although
for somewhat inconsistent reasons.
In Lexmark International, Inc. v. Static Control Components,
Inc., the court held that the technological measure did not
effectively control access because it was easily accessible by a
consumer. 27 Thus, the DMCA was inapplicable. In Chamberlain
Group, Inc. v. Skylink Technologies, Inc., the court rejected any
claim that the DMCA added an additional right, but insisted that
the DMCA merely created an additional cause of action for
liability.'28 Importantly, the court also required a showing of
infringement, and opined that Congress certainly could not have
intended to separate access from infringement. 29 Finally, it held
that consumers and competitors alike had the right to access the
copyrighted program, and thus, that the circumvention of the
technological measures was not "unauthorized" as the DMCA

124. See Lexmark Int'l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 387 F.3d
522 (6th Cir. 2004) (printer cartridges); Chamberlain Group, Inc. v. Skylink
Techs., Inc., 381 F.3d 1178 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (garage door openers).
125. See Chamberlain, 381 F.3d at 1193-94.
126. Id.
127. Lexmark, 387 F.3d at 548. The court noted:
Just as one would not say that a lock on the back door of a
house "controls access" to a house whose front door does not
contain a lock and just as one would not say that a lock on any
door of a house "controls access" to the house after its
purchaser receives the key to the lock, it does not make sense
to say that this provision of the DMCA applies to otherwisereadily-accessible copyrighted works.
Id. at 547.
128. Chamberlain,381 F.3d at 1192-93.
129. Id. at 1197.
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required. 30
The Chamberlain court cautioned that "Chamberlain's
interpretation of the DMCA would therefore grant manufacturers
broad exemptions from both the antitrust laws and the doctrine of
copyright misuse." 3 ' The court noted that an original equipment
manufacturer (OEM)1 2 could add a trivial copyrighted program to
any item, encrypt it, and effectively prohibit competitors from
reverse engineering an interoperable part.'33 It seems likely that
this fear of patent-like control for a lengthy copyright term pushed
the court to stretch the interpretation of the DMCA."' Thus, while
the courts did not find violations of copyright misuse, they alluded
that a violation might occur if plaintiffs pushed their DMCA
claims further.'35
Thus, misuse may apply where a copyright holder violates wellsettled antitrust law, but it may also be asserted where the holder
more generally overreaches its grant. Once a court has determined
that a misuse violation has occurred, there are numerous
procedural details to consider. Who has standing to assert a
misuse defense and how extensive it is in terms of scope and time
are questions that are considered in the next Section.

130. Id. at 1202.
131. Id. at 1193.
132. See Paul R. Kitch, DMCA is OEMs Ticket to "Super-Patenting" the
Unpatentable, 17 INTELL. PROP. & TECH. L.J. 5, 5 (2005) (describing original
equipment manufacturers).
133. Chamberlain, 381 F.3d at 1201; cf Margaret M. Dolan, The DMCA and
Original Equipment Manufacturers: Let Consumers Decide, 56 DEPAUL L.
REv. 153 (2006) (arguing that the Lexmark and Chamberlain courts misapplied
the DMCA and that the policy implications of the correct interpretation may not
be as dire as most commentators believe).
134. It also seems somewhat disingenuous given that neither party discussed
these implications at oral argument. Karl Fink, counsel for Chamberlain,
Presentation to Advanced Copyright Seminar (Nov. 16, 2006).
135. See Jacqueline Lipton, The Law of Unintended Consequences: The
Digital Millennium Copyright Act and Interoperability, 62 WASH. & LEE L.
REV. 487, 540 (2005) ("However, there is, as yet, no clear legislative or judicial
guidance as to whether a copyright misuse claim might validly be raised as a
defense in a DMCA infringement action.").
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol17/iss2/2
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C. How does Misuse apply?
The procedural and substantive details and effects of copyright
misuse take their cues from patent law. Where a copyright holder
is found liable for misuse, the copyright is not invalid, but it is
unenforceable against anyone during the period of misuse.'36 The
copyright will not be enforceable again until the effects of the
misuse have been purged. 3 7 Thus, the copyright holder must stop
the anticompetitive behavior or somehow rectify the public

policies it is violating.'38
Further, because misuse is purportedly a defense for the public
good, where a copyright holder has harmed the public, any
defendant can assert the defense.
Therefore, there is no
requirement that the defendant asserting misuse must have been
personally harmed.' 39 It also appears that the defendant itself need
not have clean hands in order to assert copyright misuse. 4 ° This
136. See Lasercomb Am., Inc. v. Reynolds, 911 F.2d 970, 979 n.22 (4th Cir.
1990) ("This holding of course, is not an invalidation of Lasercomb's copyright.
Lasercomb is free to bring a suit for infringement once it has purged itself of the
misuse.").
137. Kobak, The Misuse Defense, supra note 37, at 8, 21 (discussing patent
misuse and the question of whether and when purge has occurred); cf Mark A.
Lemley, Comment, The Economic Irrationalityof the Patent Misuse Doctrine,
78 CAL. L. REv. 1599, 1613 (1990) ("The doctrine applies to a misusing
patentee until she ceases her misuse and the consequences of that misuse are
'fully dissipated."') (quoting B.B. Chem. Co. v. Ellis, 314 U.S. 495, 498
(1942)).
138. Cf Harris, supra note 120, at 115 (discussing the difficulty in
determining what constitutes purge, especially in the context of conduct
violating the policies behind copyright law).
139. See Lasercomb, 911 F.2d at 979.
140. See Alcatel USA, Inc. v. DGI Techs., Inc., 166 F.3d 772, 794 (5th Cir.
1999). There, the Fifth Circuit rejected the claim that the defendant, who stole
trade secrets to reverse engineer a competing project, could not assert copyright
misuse:
In the instant case, it is DSC which seeks equitable relief in
the form of an injunction, and thus it is DSC's hands alone
that must pass the hygenic [sic] test. By misusing its software
copyright, DSC sullied its hands, barring itself from obtaining
the equitable reward of injunction on grounds of copyright
infringement. This does not mean that we repudiate the jury's
finding of unclean hands on the part of DGI. Indeed, the
Published by Digital Commons@DePaul, 2016
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seemingly opens the misuse defense to a huge number of
defendants.
In sum, copyright misuse was lifted from the world of patents,
and creates an incredible shield for a potential infringer. While
patent misuse seemingly narrows by the day, commentators and
judges continue to make noise about broadening the application of
copyright misuse. But with all the fuss, why have so few courts
actually found copyright misuse violations? 4 ' Part III analyzes
some of the reasons why copyright misuse is simply not a viable
defense and argues that courts should cease recognizing it.
III. COURTS SHOULD REJECT COPYRIGHT MISUSE

Because this Article suggests that courts should not recognize
copyright misuse as a valid affirmative defense, this Part presents
various reasons why copyright misuse is either not protecting the
correct people and property, or is inappropriate based on other
legal principles and policies. First, it examines the economic
incentives of the parties involved in copyright misuse claims.'42
Further, it analyzes the issue of standing and why courts allow
defendants who have not been injured to assert a misuse claim.'43
Other policies to consider in addressing copyright misuse include
the subjective character of the analysis.'
Additionally, this Part
considers the similarities and differences in patents and copyrights
and discusses whether it makes sense to simply transfer a defense
from one area to the other.'45 Finally, because the contracts at
issue are often arranged by sophisticated parties, this Part contends
that courts should uphold them to the extent allowed by contract
law. 146

deceptive practices used by DGI to obtain a copy of DSC's
software left it with very dirty mitts. Nevertheless, this
finding is irrelevant given the particular posture of this case.
Id. (citations omitted).
141. See Ekstrand, supra note 50, at 579.
142. See infra notes 147-68 and accompanying text.
143. See infra notes 169-86 and accompanying text.
144. See infra notes 187-203 and accompanying text.
145. See infra notes 204-23 and accompanying text.
146. See infra notes 224-49 and accompanying text.
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A. CopyrightMisuse Provides Ill-Advised Economic Incentives
In the context of patent misuse, Congress and the courts have
been narrowing the doctrine since it first arrived on the scene.'47
Thus, although initially Congress was persuaded that this judicially
created doctrine deserved codification, it has continually amended
the statute to include specific instances of conduct which do not
constitute patent misuse."' In a recent case, the Supreme Court
effectively overruled part of Morton Salt and, relying on
amendments to 35 U.S.C. § 271(d), noted that a mere tying
arrangement does not constitute a per se antitrust violation.'49
Instead, the Court held that a challenger must prove market power
to succeed with such a claim. 5 '
Why is this narrowing occurring? One potential reason is that
courts and legislators have begun to realize that the misuse
doctrine provides absurd incentives for potential infringers.
Professor Mark Lemley put this succinctly:
[T]he patent misuse doctrine is available only as an
affirmative defense in infringement cases.
Patentees cannot be sued for misuse or enjoined
from misusing their patents. .

.

. Since patentees

have no reason to sue noninfringing third parties for
infringement, only patent infringers benefit from
the doctrine.
In addition, since there is no
requirement that the misuse have harmed the
infringer using the defense, the patent misuse
doctrine benefits any infringer whose patentee has
committed misuse.151
Thus, as demonstrated in the introductory hypothetical, a

147. Lemley, supra note 137, at 1610 (describing patent misuse as "a
common law doctrine that continues to exist alongside statutory patent law, but
[whose] parameters have been expressly limited by statute").
148.
149.
150.
151.

35 U.S.C. § 271(d) (2000).
Ill. Tool Works Inc. v. Indep. Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. 28, 31 (2006).
Id.
Lemley, supra note 137, at 1610; see also infra Part III.B (discussing

standing).
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licensee who simply decides that it no longer wants to pay for the
product, or who subsequently discovers an easy way to copy the
work at issue, can search its license for clauses and terms that
violate the scope of the copyright grant. And because the
defendant need not be personally harmed, the infringer can even
search the licenses of others. If it finds such a term, the licensee
can subsequently infringe the copyright knowing that if the
copyright holder brings suit, it can simply assert misuse as a
defense.
Further, because antitrust and misuse are co-extensive, an
accused infringer can assert misuse as a defense while
counterclaiming for a breach of the antitrust laws. 52 A copyright
infringer who successfully asserts a misuse defense causes the
copyright to be unenforceable for the period while the misuse is
occurring.'53 There is no assessment of the actual effect of the
harm-this "blunt" approach is all that is available.'54 Winning an
antitrust claim, on the other hand, provides the infringer with
money damages. 155 Thus, assuming the party is truly infringing the
copyright, he can obtain three benefits: free use of the copyright,
unenforceability of the copyright against himself and others, and
antitrust damages. 56 It seems unlikely that courts want to reward
the conduct of infringing defendants in this way.
One might argue that because copyright misuse is only an
affirmative defense and not an independent claim, only those
plaintiffs who brirg suit against infringers will be liable. This

152. Lemley, supra note 137, at 1617 ("Since the misuse doctrine and the
antitrust laws are driven by independent policies, recovery under one doctrine is
no bar to recovery on independent grounds under the other, even though the
underlying misuse by the patentee is the same.").
153. Lasercomb Am., Inc. v. Reynolds, 911 F.2d 970, 979 n.22 (4th Cir.
1990).
154. Jennifer R. Knight, Copyright Misuse v. Freedom of Contract: And the
Winner Is. . ., 73 TENN. L. REv. 237 (2006) ("The blunt instrument of copyright
misuse, which renders a copyright unenforceable, is overly punitive under many
circumstances when an author may have overreached."); Kathryn Judge, Note,
Rethinking CopyrightMisuse, 57 STAN. L. REv. 901, 904 (2004).
155. Lemley, supra note 137, at 1617 & n. 119 (discussing the potential for
treble damages in antitrust cases).
156. See id. at 1617 & n.1 17 (citing Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine
Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100, 140-41 (1969)).
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argument essentially implies that as long as the plaintiff doesn't
haul the defendant into court on infringement claims, it can
This leads to two
continue its anticompetitive behavior.
interesting responses.
First, our litigation system is founded on the belief that plaintiffs
who have a good-faith claim of wrongdoing should be permitted to
argue their cases in court. We should not punish plaintiffs for

trying to assert claims where they have a chance at succeeding.' 57
As discussed in Part IV, we already have civil penalties and ethical
rules to punish those who bring illegitimate claims merely to
harass a defendant.' 58 Indeed, the Noerr-Pennington doctrine
recognizes the right of plaintiffs to bring good-faith lawsuits to

enforce their rights.'59
Second, this result begs the question of why copyright misuse is
recognized only as an affirmative defense. 6 ' If it exists to prevent
157. For example, the Supreme Court has held that 17 U.S.C. § 505 supports
an evenhanded approach to the awarding of attorneys' fees in order to promote
the assertion of meritorious claims and defenses in copyright cases. See
generally Robert Aloysius Hyde & Lisa M. Sharrock, A Decade down the Road
but Still Running Through the Jungle: A Critical Review of Post-Fogerty Fee
Awards, 52 U. KAN. L. REv. 467 (2004).
158. See infra Part IV.B (discussing remedies like wrongful use of civil
proceedings and abuse of process).
159. See Davis supra note 24, at 138 (2006) ("On the other hand, under the
Noerr-Pennington doctrine, copyright owners can probably claim that they are
immune from liability for copyright misuse where the alleged improper conduct
is a lawsuit brought against a competitor seeking to enforce intellectual property
rights.") (internal citation omitted). Davis also notes, however, that the Practice
Management court denied the Noerr-Pennington justification. Id.; see also
Practice Mgmt. Info. Corp. v. Am. Med. Assn., 121 F.3d 516, 521 (1997)
(rejecting Noerr-Pennington defense because where copyright misuse does not
require an antitrust violation, antitrust defenses need not be considered).
Further, the Noerr-Pennington doctrine provides that "sham" litigation is not
protected and thus, those who bring sham suits may be liable for abuse of
process or another civil wrong. Davis, supra note 24, at 138.
160. Cf Jeffery, supra note 64, at 145 (1998) (discussing one of the only
cases to address copyright misuse as an affirmative claim, Electronic Data
Systems Corp. v. Computer Associates International, Inc., 802 F. Supp. 1463
(N.D. Tex. 1992), which allowed a misuse claim in a declaratory judgment
proceeding). Although the court ultimately permitted the claim, because it was
in a declaratory judgment non-infringement action, it seems essentially the same
as asserting misuse as an affirmative defense to infringement.
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harm to the public through nonenforcement of anticompetitive
clauses, why should it be limited to the defensive position?
Numerous commentators have insisted on the need for a copyright
misuse defense because it covers violations that may not rise to the
level of an antitrust violation. 6 ' If such violations are so terrible,
perhaps we should be allowing licensees or indeed, any member of
the public, to affirmatively sue the copyright holder for misuse.
But most courts addressing the issue have held that one may not
affirmatively bring a claim of misuse. 6 2 This demonstrates that
courts do not think misuse is important enough to allow parties to
assert it outside of an affirmative defense.
One might argue that we need these incentives and copyright
misuse because most likely, the copyright holder or licensor is a
big company trying to exert its unfair bargaining power over
smaller licensees. These misuse claims typically arise in the
context of software rather than in more "artistic" settings. Thus,
the argument goes, without some protection, corporate copyright
owners can run roughshod over the "little guy," and do whatever
they please. Further, if courts typically do not find actual cases of
misuse, what is the harm in keeping the doctrine on the books?
But simply because a company is established and large does not
mean it is breaking the laws. Further, this is certainly not always
the setup in copyright law. It is not even always the case in patent
law where the patentee might be a single inventor with a Fortune
500 company trying to buy out its product.'63 Thus, in the context
of copyrights, the owner may be a startup software company, a
large conglomerate, a starving painter, or a record company."
161. See, e.g., Scher, supra note 20, at 101 ("Clearly, then, the defense of
copyright misuse should be viewed separately from antitrust law."); Kobak, A
Sensible Doctrine of Misuse, supra note 6, at 49; Meurer, supra note 94, at
1872.
162. See Jeffery, supra note 64, at 145 (citing Broad. Music, Inc. v.
Hearst/ABC Viacom, Entm't Servs., 746 F. Supp. 320 (S.D.N.Y. 1990). The
BMI court called an affirmative claim for misuse "unprecedented." Id. (citing
Broad. Music, 746 F. Supp. at 328).

163. Of course, it is probably easier for even a solo inventor patentee to gain
market power that he can exert over the licensor given the exclusive nature of
patents versus copyrights.
164. See Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc., 510 U.S. 517, 524 (1994). The Court there
discussed the difference between cases brought in the Civil Rights context and
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol17/iss2/2
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Where a copyright holder is a smaller entity than the defendant is,
the misuse doctrine can potentially work against the policies it
purports to advance. Thus, the big company can bully the licensor
into dropping an infringement suit by attacking its, or any other,
license. In fact, the big company can suggest anticompetitive
terms to "trick" the copyright holder into misuse-worthy conduct.
And per Practice Management, it is irrelevant to a finding of
misuse which party to the contract suggested the anticompetitive
terms.'6 5 Providing such an infringer with another potential
defense, even if it is eventually found inapplicable, can tie up the
plaintiff in court for years. Bad-faith allegations of copyright
misuse may require extensive documentation and studies about the
anticompetitive effects and market power of the copyright. Thus,
keeping the misuse doctrine provides another avenue for either a
large or small defendant to use as a weapon to safeguard its free
riding.
Finally, what about the economic incentives of the copyright
holders? The utilitarian theory of copyright posits that we reward
authors so that they continue to create.'6 6 Thus, we must allow

those brought under copyright law:
The goals and objectives of the two Acts are likewise not
completely similar. Oftentimes, in the civil rights context,
impecunious "private attorney general" plaintiffs can ill afford
to litigate their claims against defendants with more resources.
Congress sought to redress this balance in part, and to provide
incentives for the bringing of meritorious lawsuits, by treating
successful plaintiffs more favorably than successful
defendants in terms of the award of attorney's fees. The
primary purpose of the Copyright Act is to encourage the
production of original literary, artistic, and musical expression
for the good of the public. In the copyright context, it has
been noted that "entities which sue for copyright infringement
as plaintiffs can run the gamut from corporate behemoths to
starving artists; the same is true of prospective copyright
defendants."
Id. (quoting Cohen v. Va. Elec. & Power Co., 617 F. Supp. 619, 622-23 (E.D.
Va. 1985)).
165. Practice Mgmt. Info. Corp. v. Am. Med. Ass'n, 121 F.3d 516, 520-21
(9th Cir. 1997).
166. See Patrick W. Ogilvy, Frozen in Time? New Technologies, Fixation,
and the Derivative Work Right, 8 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 687, 707 (2006).
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copyright holders to reap the benefits of the copyright grant. One
way to do this is for those authors to license their works to others.
But if the threat of copyright misuse hangs in the air as some
unknown potential hammer, potential authors (and their
employers) may simply decide the supposed benefits are not worth
the effort. 67 That is, if we fail to recognize licenses between
informed parties, innovation may decrease as authors find other,
more secretive ways, to protect their works, or stop creating them
altogether. 6

B. CopyrightMisuse Ignores Typical Standing Requirements
That a defendant may assert copyright misuse as an affirmative
defense even though it has not personally been injured is
anomalous in the normal realm of civil litigation. Generally, for a
plaintiff to bring suit, it must show that it personally has been
injured and is not bringing a claim as a third party.'69 Article III
requires a "case or controversy" and thus, the plaintiff must show
an injury, causation between that injury and the defendant's
conduct, and the possibility that the harm can be redressed by
suit. 7 Further, for a private party to have standing to bring an
antitrust claim under the Sherman Act or Clayton Act, that party
must have been injured by the anticompetitive behavior. 7' While
167. See Kobak, A Sensible Doctrine of Misuse, supra note 6, at 38-39
(calling the extensive misuse doctrine currently in place "over-deterring"). This
over-deterrent causes intellectual property owners to under utilize their
monopoly grant.
168. See infra notes 267-68 and accompanying text.
169. See Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of
Church and State, 454 U.S. 464 (1982); see also Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490,
499 (1975) ("[E]ven when the plaintiff has alleged injury sufficient to meet the
'case or controversy' requirement, this Court has held that the plaintiff generally
must assert his own legal rights and interests, and cannot rest his claim to relief
on the legal rights or interests of third parties.").
170. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1; see also Lujan v. Defenders of
Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992).
171. Franklin A. Gevurtz, Vertical Restraints on Competition, 54 AM. J.
COMP. L. 357, 360 (2006); see also Robin Feldman, The Open Source
Biotechnology Movement: Is it PatentMisuse?, 6 MiNN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 117,
137 (2004) (discussing the "relaxed" standards to qualify for standing to bring a
misuse claim as compared to an antitrust claim).
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol17/iss2/2
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copyright misuse is an affirmative defense rather than an
independent claim brought by a plaintiff, the same principles of
72
standing should apply.1
But as noted above, a defendant can assert copyright misuse
even if it has not been harmed. 173 Courts have sometimes allowed
this "representational standing.""
For example, in Barrows v.
for breach of contract.175
sued
was
homeowner
white
a
Jackson,
The homeowner asserted an affirmative defense based on the
racially restrictive covenant. 176 Thus, although the homeowner was
not personally harmed-since he was white-he could assert the
rights of black homeowners because he had an interest in the
litigation in that he might be forced to pay damages for breach of
77
the racial covenant.
Admittedly, this might encompass some situations where
copyright misuse arises. Where a licensee is being sued for breach
of contract and he has indeed breached the contract, he will be
liable for damages unless he can invalidate the contract through
misuse. But this situation seems rare among the cases typically
brought. Generally, defendants asserting misuse are being sued for
copyright infringement.
Such copyright rights are not
encompassed in the license itself, but are statutorily based.7 7 That
is, the infringement suit is not necessarily grounded in the license
172. See Jeffery, supra note 64, at 145 (noting the "important distinction"
between unclean hands and copyright misuse with regard to the lack of
necessity of harm to the defendant). Jeffrey explains:
The defense of unclean hands in a copyright context
traditionally required that the plaintiff's wrongdoing harm or
prejudice the defendant in some way or that the plaintiff
participate in the very act of infringement with which the
defendant was charged. However, under the expansion of the
doctrine in more recent cases to include a subcategory for the
misuse defense, it is not necessary for the defendant to have
been harmed by the practice challenged.
Id. (citations omitted).
173. See supra notes 139-40 and accompanying text.
174. See Tacy F. Flint, Comment, A New Brand of Representational
Standing, 70 U. CHI. L. REv. 1037, 1049 (2003).
175. Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249 (1953).
176. Flint, supra note 174, at 1049.
177. Id.
178. See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2000).
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agreement. Thus, whether the license violates contract law should

not affect whether or not the defendant is liable for infringement.
In trademark law, for example, the purpose of the doctrines and
protections is to protect consumers from confusion. 179 Certainly,

trademark rights also help companies protect their goodwill,18 ° but
the consumer protection purpose is typically held out as the most
important.'
But note that under the Lanham Act, consumers do
not have standing to bring an infringement suit. 182 Thus in at least

one area of intellectual property law, we do not allow the general
public to bring an action to assert generalized societal harm.
Further, as discussed by Professor Lemley, the misuse remedy is
unrelated to the actual injury.'8 3 Thus while in antitrust cases, the
remedy is proportional to the level of the damage caused, in
misuse cases, there is but one remedy-the copyright is
unenforceable-regardless of the effect of the misuse."' There is
no examination of the level of overreaching, the good faith (if any)
of the copyright holder, or the injury to the defendant. Therefore,
allowing one who has not personally been injured provides a
windfall to that defendant, a windfall that is not even rationally

179. See Ronald J. Horta, Note, Without Secondary Meaning, Do Product
Design Trade Dress ProtectionsFunction as Infinite Patents?, 27 SUFFOLK U.
L. REV. 113, 117 (1993) (citing S. REP. No. 79-1333, at 3-5 (1946)).
180. See Michael B. Weitman, Note, Fair Use in Trademark in the Post KP
Permanent World, 71 BROOK. L. REV. 1665, 1669 (2006).
181. Horta, supra note 179, at 117.
182. See Ryan McLeod, Injunction Junction: Remembering the Proper
Function and Form of Equitable Relief in Trademark Law, 2006 DUKE L. &
TECH. REV. 13, 20 (2006) (noting as a potential justification for the prohibition
of consumer-based trademark suits that perhaps the legislature believes that a
trademark holder "adequately represents" the consumers' interests).
183. Lemley, supra note 137, at 1616.
184. Id. at 1617. Lemley discussed the inherent irrationality of this:
In a normal antitrust case, a successful plaintiff will recover
damages that are related to the injury the defendant has
inflicted on him. In any normal lawsuit, the goal is for
damages paid to equal injuries inflicted. In the patent misuse
case, on the other hand, the only goal is to determine liability.
Once the plaintiff proves misuse, the remedy is set without
any regard for injury to the infringer or to society.
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related to the amount of damage to the injured party. 8 '
One might argue that we already allow these types of claims
without traditional standing in cases like inequitable conduct and
fraud on the Patent and Trademark Office. There, defendants can
assert that the owner of the intellectual property obtained its rights
by deceiving the government.'86 But those claims rely on the fact
that the plaintiff should not have had the intellectual property right
in the first place. That is, but for the fraudulent conduct, the
government office would not have awarded the patent or
trademark. In contrast, in the case of misuse, there is often no
dispute that the plaintiff has a valid copyright and that the
defendant is infringing it. Thus, comparing inequitable conduct to
misuse seems inapposite. Rendering the copyright unenforceable
is a blunt punishment that fails to take actual context into account.
Because copyright misuse has these lax standing requirements, it
provides damages that are unrelated to the actual injury to one who
may not have even been injured.
C. Misuse Requires an Inherently Subjective Analysis
Often, courts apply copyright misuse where the plaintiffs
actions have not reached the level of an antitrust violation, but
where the plaintiff has used its copyright in a way that overreaches
its scope.' 87 The scope of the copyright grant, however, is not
clearly defined.'88 Thus, punishing those who try to reach beyond
185. See Thomas F. Cotter, The Procompetitive Interest in Intellectual
Property Law, 48 WM. & MARY L. REv. 483, 505 (2006) (noting that "the

beyond-the-scope rationale offers no reason why efforts to expand one's IP
rights beyond the scope of the grant is such an egregious offense that, contrary
to conventional standing requirements, it may be pleaded by someone who is
unaffected by the offending transaction").
186. See generally Linda K. McLeod, Knew or Should Have Known,
Reckless Disregardfor the Truth, and Fraud Before the Trademark Office, 34

AIPLA Q.J. 287 (2006) (detailing some of these claims).
187. See, e.g., Lasercomb Am., Inc. v. Reynolds, 911 F.2d 970 (4th Cir.
1990).
188. I came across one author who, in his proposal for a copyright misuse
defense noted: "First, the court must define the scope of the copyright. This
simply involves reading the copyright registration and understanding that what
the grant protects." Scher, supra note 20, at 104 (internal citations omitted). If
this determination is as simple as Scher proposes, one wonders why there is
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their grant may not be consistent with our rights to know clearly
what the law is in advance of being penalized.'89
One commentator has argued that misuse should be found
wherever the copyright is not used to further the public policy of
"encouraging the development of the creative arts."' 9 ° Another
contends that by restricting the copyrighted work, the owner is
"restricting ... access to ideas that would aid in the development
of new, creative products."''
This raises issues of compulsory
licensing, however, not copyright misuse. A copyright holder is
under no requirement to license its products, and may instead
choose to keep the works unpublished.'92 In fact, in the context of
patent law, Congress has specifically legislated that refusing to
license a patented item is not grounds for a finding of misuse."'
Thus, a copyright holder should not be liable for misuse solely for
restricting access to its works.
Professor Chisum has noted the difficulty of determining what
constitutes overreaching beyond the scope of the grant, calling it
"vague."' 94 Another analyst, criticizing the "scope of the grant
test" noted that "[the test] presupposes some transcendent notion
of what constitutes 'natural' or 'proper' patent or copyright
exploitation and thus fails to identify any legal rules or standards
for fixing the boundaries of legitimate conduct."' 95 Interestingly,
infringement litigation at all.
189. See David J. Franklyn, Toward a Coherent Theory of Tort Liability for
TrademarkLicensors, 72 S. CAL. L. REV. 1,35 (1998); Cass Sunstein, Problems
with Rules, 83 CAL. L. REV. 953, 1007 (1995).
190. Georgenson, supra note 38, at 319. Georgenson argued that misuse was
more appropriate than fair use as a framework in which to analyze reverse
engineering cases. Id. at 316-19. She noted that "[c]opyright misuse analysis
permits a court to address the public policy that is the actual basis of its
conclusions without having to address statutory factors in an inconsistent
manner." Id. at 317. It seems difficult though, to argue that analyzing whether
a behavior meets a general "policy" is more predictable for litigants than using
concrete statutory factors.
191. Id.

192. See Joseph P. Bauer, Refusals to Deal with Competitors by Owners of
Patents and Copyrights: Reflections on the Image Technical and Xerox
Decisions, 55 DEPAUL L. REV. 1211, 1231 (2006).

193. 35 U.S.C. § 271(d) (2000).
194. DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS, 19.04 [2] (2006).
195. Scher, supra note 20, at 106 (quoting Note, Clarifying the Copyright
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one author writes that "[t]he mixed reception courts have given the
doctrine may be attributable in part to confusion about what
1'
constitutes misuse.'

96

Litigants have the right to seek resolution of their controversies
in a court of law. Thus, where the scope of the copyright is
potentially vague, it is not good policy to prevent plaintiffs from
suing to determine those rights. 97 Some authors have recognized
this potential, noting that "[tihe courts must be careful not to place
copyright owners on a razor's edge, however, where a mistake in a
copyright warning precludes enforcement of the copyright (at least
until the warning is withdrawn), leading them out of an abundance
of caution to underenforce [sic] their legitimate rights."' 98 Thus,
fluctuating misuse standards imperfectly protect and punish those
targeted by the law.
Even in the patent realm, as ideas about the scope and policies
of patent rights have changed over time, the misuse defense has
adapted as well.' 99 The patent misuse defense has expanded and
contracted as courts have varied their interpretation of its
language. Copyright holders are even more subject to such ad hoc
Misuse Defense: The Role of Antitrust Standards, 104 HARV. L. REv. 1289,
1295 (1991)).
196. Judge, supra note 154, at 903-04 (also discussing the antitrust and
copyright policy approaches and noting "the relationship between the two
strands, and the degree to which competition policy underlies the public policy
approach, has been a source of significant confusion").
197. Cf Ekstrand, supra note 50, at 584-85 (discussing a case where a
plaintiff was "aggressively" pursuing a potential infringer and the court held that
did not constitute misuse).
198. William F. Patry & Richard A. Posner, Fair Use anda Statutory Reform
in the Wake of Eldred, 92 CAL. L. REv. 1639, 1659 (2004).
199. Dawson Chem. Co. v. Rohm & Haas Co., 448 U.S. 176, 200 (1980)
(referring to uncertainty in the law of patent misuse before the 1952
amendments and noting "[t]his state of affairs made it difficult for patent
lawyers to advise their clients ... and to render secure opinions on the validity
of proposed licensing arrangements"); see also DONALD S. CHISUM, ET AL.,
PRINCIPLES OF PATENT LAW 1084 (3d ed. 2004); Kobak, The Misuse Defense,
supra note 37, at 22 (discussing in the context of patents that many federal
judges are so overburdened that the attractiveness of discarding an infringement
case on summary judgment based on misuse is quite high); cf Jeffery, supra
note 64, at 145 (discussing the lack of standards for determining what copyright
misuse encompasses and noting that "this leaves the practitioner with wide
latitude to argue for or against 'misuse' in a specific case").
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determinations.2 0" As copyright misuse is not codified, litigants
must depend on case-by-case analyses to assess their conduct.20 '
This uncertainty in the law is suboptimal and prevents parties from
This inefficiency results because parties
efficiently acting. 2
cannot plan their conduct around predictable rules. 23 Thus,
because defining the metes and bounds of copyright is admittedly
difficult, the copyright holder should not suffer such considerable
consequences from its erroneous interpretation.
D. Patentand CopyrightLaw Are Distinct
Many commentators argue that because patents and copyrights
are so similar, it makes perfect sense to apply a defense that
originated in patent law to copyright law.2" Various courts have
raised this point, although significantly, they rarely actually extend
the misuse doctrine. 25 Additionally, one commentator contended
that because patents and copyrights both grew out of English law
that was meant to protect against monopolies, similar treatment of
the substantive law is necessary and appropriate. 6
200. See Cotter, supra note 185, at 505 (noting that while the literal terms of
a patent are often difficult to discern, those of a copyright are even more
difficult given the lack of a claims-like process).
201. See Clifford, supra note 70, at 262 ("Also, as demonstrated above, the
cases have been far from unified in what constitutes misuse.").
202. Cf Bauer, supra note 192, at 1235 ("The scope of the patent and
copyright 'misuse' doctrine is imprecise and shifting."); Meurer, supra note 94,
at 1887-88 (noting that "[o]ptimal copyright regulation of sharing must balance
the rights of users and sellers") (emphasis added).
203. See, e.g., Harris, supra note 120, at 117-18 (noting that uncertainty in
how misuse is applied will harm defendants who cannot know in advance
whether they will be held liable for infringement); Judge, supra note 154, at 904
(arguing for a clarification of misuse so copyright owners will be "on notice of
what constitutes [copyright] misuse"); Franklyn, supra note 189, at 35 ("[I]t is
generally recognized that clear rules enable more efficient business planning
which, in turn, should inure to the benefit of society.").
204. See Scher, supra note 20, at 95-97.
205. See, e.g., Telecom Technical Servs. Inc. v. Rolm Co., 388 F.3d 820, 831
(11 th Cir. 2004) ("Although the patent misuse defense closely fits the copyright
law situation and may someday be extended to discipline those who abuse their
copyrights, we decline to extend the application in the context before us because
there is no antitrust violation.").
206. See Scher, supra note 20, at 96. Scher outlined the development of
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Congress has not codified copyright misuse. Importantly,
Congress codified patent misuse in 1952 after courts took the
patent misuse doctrine "to the extreme. 2 °7 It seems strange that
Congress would choose to put its imprimatur on one type of
misuse, but not the other. Perhaps Congress sees what some courts
do not-that patents and copyrights have fundamental differences
that make copyright misuse not as favorable. Additionally and
significantly, while the Supreme Court explicitly recognized patent
misuse, it has never affirmatively recognized the doctrine of
copyright misuse.2 °8
The argument that patent and copyright law are identical ignores
the fact that patents and copyrights have distinct characteristics
and sets of laws.2"9 Importantly, patents require essentially
21
absolute novelty, 2 ° while copyrights require only originality. 1
This means that where a patentee forces someone into an unfair
license, that licensee has no choice but to accept the unfair terms if
Even if the licensee
it wants to use the patented item.
codified intellectual property practices:
Parliament addressed these problems (price inflation and
product shortages due to monopolies) by passing the Statute
of Monopolies, which prohibited the Crown from granting
monopoly power to anyone except creators of new inventions,
and to them only for a period of fourteen years....
Copyright law in England also grew out of a conflict between
the English Crown's attempt to create, and Parliament's desire
to curtail, monopolies .. . . In 1710, Parliament reacted by
passing the first known copyright act, the Statute of Anne.
The statute granted the Stationer's Company exclusive
publishing rights, but only for a limited time.
Id. "Clearly, 'the English statutory treatment of copyright was similar to that of
patent in that the creator was granted a monopoly for a limited time only."' Id.
(quoting Lasercomb Am., Inc. v. Reynolds, 911 F.2d 970, 975 (4th Cir. 1990)).
207. CHISUM, ET AL., supra note 199, at 1084-85.
208. See Jeffery, supra note 64, at 144. This author goes on to note that the
Court has "however, tacitly approved of the doctrine." Id. (citing United States
v. Loew's, Inc., 371 U.S. 32, 45-47 (1968)).
209. See Kobak, A Sensible Doctrine of Misuse, supra note 6, at 33 ("This
historical basis for the patent misuse doctrine, however, has little application to
copyright, which has no comparable system of examination and public
disclosure of precise, carefully defined claims.").
210. There is a one year grace period. See 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2000).
211. See 17 U.S.C. § 102 (2000).
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independently developed the very same invention, he could not use
it.212 So for the potential licensee of a patent, this license is its only

option for using the product. Because the patentee has complete
exclusivity, his rights extend for a relatively brief periodgenerally, 20 years from the date the patent is filed.1 3
A copyright holder does not enjoy complete exclusivity,214 but
her rights extend for a comparatively longer time."1 5 Because
copyrights do not require absolute novelty, this leaves open the
opportunity for a competitor to independently create its own
product.2 1 6 Thus, the effects of an anticompetitive license will not
be as great because a licensee who refuses to enter an unfair
agreement has other options. 1 7 It can try to create the copyrighted
work on its own or shop for other independently developed works
that offer better license terms.
In Lasercomb, the court also argued that because copyright and
patent were combined into one clause in the Constitution, this
showed the Framers' intention that the two sets of laws should be
harmonious. 28 Additionally, the court discussed the histories of
212. See 35 U.S.C. § 154 (giving patentees the exclusive right to exclude
others from making, using, selling, or offering to sell the patented device).

213. Id.
214. See infra notes 281-96 and accompanying text (discussing the fair use
defense).
215. 17 U.S.C. § 302 (extending copyright for the life of the author plus 70
years).
216. See, e.g., Reed-Union Corp. v. Turtle Wax, Inc., 77 F.3d 909, 913 (7th
Cir. 1996) ("We do not say that [copyright misuse exists as a defense] (an open
issue in this court); copyrights do not exclude independent expression and
therefore create less market power than patents.").
217. Although he has changed his tune somewhat, Judge Poser recognized
this distinction at one point. See Saturday Evening Post Co. v. Rumbleseat
Press, Inc., 816 F.2d 1191, 1200 (7th Cir. 1987) (arguing that patent misuse
should look only to antitrust principles because any other system would be too
uncertain, and that "[tihis point applies with even greater force to copyright
misuse, where the danger of monopoly is less"); see also supra note 71 and
accompanying text.
218. Lasercomb Am., Inc. v. Reynolds, 911 F.2d 970, 975 (4th Cir. 1990)
(noting that "the framers combined the two concepts in one clause, stating a
unitary purpose-to promote progress"); see also U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cl. 8
("[Congress shall have power] To promote the Progress of Science and useful
Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right
to their respective Writings and Discoveries."); Scher, supra note 20, at 96-97
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the laws in England and offered its opinion that patents and
copyrights are founded on the same fundamental principles of
preventing monopolistic behavior.2"9
There are sections of each area of law, however, that do not
translate to the other. Copyright law enjoys the affirmative
defense of fair use.22 Fair use was initially judicially created and
eventually codified by Congress in 1976.2 Fair use provides that
one may encroach on a copyright owner's rights for some specific
purposes and if some conditions are met.222 Patent law, however,
has no such fair use defense. Indeed, a patent grants the owner the
exclusive right to exclude others from making, using, or selling
that product. 223 There are no exceptions for educational or other

policy reasons. Thus, not all defenses necessarily translate from
one arena to the other. Although patent law and copyright law are
grounded in similar concerns, they are sufficiently different to
warrant caution in merely transplanting misuse from one to the
other.
E. Misuse DisregardsConsensualBargains
Forbidding licensors and licensees from contracting for various
rights is also a form of "paternalism.

'224

We should allow parties

to agree on license terms when there is a free bargain and informed
consent. Further, where plaintiffs engage in price discrimination,
it should not be a per se case of copyright misuse. Price
("The Framers, like the English, considered the property rights protected by
copyrights and patents to be similar. As a result, the constitutional grant which
vests in Congress the power to create both copyright and patent laws is
combined in one clause, stating a unitary purpose ... .
219. Lasercomb, 911 F.2d at 974-75.
220. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2000).
221. Kenneth D. Crews, Fair Use and the "Most Important Factor": An
Empirical Test of the Copyright Principle, (Aug. 23, 2006) (working paper).
222. See id.; see also Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471
U.S. 539 (1985). See infra notes 281-96 and accompanying text discussing fair
use as an alternative to copyright misuse.
223. 35 U.S.C. § 154 (2000).
224. Judge, supra note 154, at 937 ("To the extent that copyright misuse
arises from contractual relations between a copyright holder and his licensees,
there is a question of whether judicial interference undermines freedom of
contract and has an overtone of paternalism.").
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discrimination can help copyright owners and licensees develop
the pricing scheme that is most beneficial for all users.
1. Informed consent
Where contracting parties are both informed, especially when
they are both sophisticated businesses, it seems illogical to later
determine that one did not understand its bargain. Courts have
recognized parties' rights to bargain for various types of
consideration.225 For example, in Medimmune, Inc. v. Genentech,
Inc., the Federal Circuit allowed the parties to contract away the
right to future challenges of the validity of the patent at issue.226
Shrinkwrap licenses have similarly been upheld as valid
contracts.22 Thus, courts seem unwilling to take a paternalistic
view that parties may be coerced into unfavorable bargains.
One scholar recognized the divergence in courts' opinions as to
whether contractual bargaining of certain rights was valid or was
copyright misuse.228 She suggested creating a new test that would
225. See Kathleen K. Olson, Preserving the Copyright Balance: Statutory
and Constitutional Preemption of Contract-Based Claims, 11 CoMM. L. &
POL'Y 83, 90 (2006) ("The tension between contract and copyright can be
difficult to reconcile, because the right of contract is an important principle in
American law that courts generally uphold.").
226. Medimmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 427 F.3d 958 (Fed. Cir. 2005)
(upholding a contract where the licensee agreed not to challenge the validity of
the patent), rev'd, 127 S. Ct. 764 (2007). The court had to balance the policy of
informed consent and free bargaining with the possibility that large licensors
might strong arm licensees into contracts where the licensee does not yet have
enough information to assess the patent's validity.
227. ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1449 (7th Cir. 1996).
Shrinkwrap licenses provide consumers with notice of what agreements they are
making by buying the product at issue. Id. These licenses may prohibit the
buyer from future resale or require the use of certain replacement parts. See,
e.g., Lexmark Int'l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 387 F.3d 522, 530
(6th Cir. 2004). But see Davis, supra note 24, at 146-47 (arguing that ProCD
will not help a plaintiff accused of copyright misuse because that case involved
uncopyrightable material and a restrictive license seemingly constitutes misuse);
Olson, supra note 225, at 90-91, 126 (noting that the line between contract law
and copyright law is vague and whether a license restriction will be enforced is
uncertain, and also that some courts have begun to see these contracts as
examples of misuse).
228. See Knight, supra note 154. Knight wrote about these two approaches:
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balance various rights and policies of the parties involved. 229 But
her test seemingly considers policies already in place in contract
law-such as the license, the circumstances, the sophistication of
the parties, and the policies that may be impacted. 23 ° It is
unnecessary to draw copyright misuse into the discussion when
contract law already provides remedies.
That the copyright misuse doctrine allows defendants who
themselves suggested the anticompetitive license terms to assert
the defense seems illogical.2 1' Even assuming for the moment that
where licensees were forced to accept bad terms or did not
understand them might be considered misuse, where the licensees
themselves suggested the unfair terms, they should be bound by
them.
The Practice Management court rejected such a
justification that the licensee suggested the unfavorable terms. 232 It
held that "[b]y agreeing to license the [copyrighted work] in this
manner, the AMA used its copyright 'in a manner violative of the
public policy embodied in the grant of a copyright."' 233 Thus, the
Ninth Circuit essentially held that merely agreeing to terms
suggested by a licensee, if the terms are anticompetitive, could
render a copyright unenforceable because it injures the public at
large.
This has the potential for savvy licensees to attempt to render
copyrights unenforceable by suggesting unfair terms. Consider the
case where the copyright holder is an up and coming musical artist
The circuit courts are split as to when and how copyright
owners may expand their rights beyond the limited rights
granted by Congress in the Copyright Act. The courts
approach the problem from two different perspectives:
copyright misuse and freedom of contract .... [T]he law in

this important area will remain unpredictable until either
Congress or the Supreme Court decides to step in.
Id. at 266.
229. Id. at 262.
230. Id.
231. See Practice Mgmt. Info. Corp. v. Am. Med. Ass'n, 121 F.3d 516, 521

(9th Cir. 1997) ("Although [the licensee] apparently had nothing to gain from
inclusion of the exclusivity provision, which side urged its inclusion is of no
consequence.").
232. Id.
233. Id. (quoting Lasercomb Am., Inc. v. Reynolds, 911 F.2d 970, 977 (4th
Cir. 1990)).
Published by Digital Commons@DePaul, 2016

41

DePaul Journal of Art, Technology & Intellectual Property Law, Vol. 17, Iss. 2 [2016], Art. 2

248

DEPA UL J. ART & ENT. LAW

[Vol. XVII:207

desperate to sell her works. A record company could suggest that
they will license her currently popular song and, in exchange for a
lower price, will also license all of her earlier, lesser known works
that the company never intends to use. 3 In theory, the record
company could simply refuse to pay royalties and argue that the
blanket license is violative of the public policies behind copyright
and thus, the singer's copyright is unenforceable. That the
company suggested the terms would be of no import.235 Clearly,
this is not how misuse should operate. 6 Courts should not look at
the agreements in the abstract and simply decide whether they are
anticompetitive. Courts should instead examine the context in
which these agreements were made and determine whether the
defendant made a free bargain.237
Supporters of the misuse defense may argue that where a
copyright holder has sufficient market power or a monopoly, the
defendant may have no choice but to accept the unfavorable deal if
it wants to use the product.2 3 ' But this seemingly indicates that
234. This is a blanket license like that in F.E.L. Publications,Ltd. v. Catholic
Bishop of Chicago, 506 F. Supp. 1127 (D.C. Ill. 1981).
235. See PracticeMgmt., 121 F.3d at 521.
236. See Judge, supra note 154, at 940. Judge recognized this troubling
situation:
Under the current regime, it appears that a licensee can
negotiate inclusion of an exclusivity or other potentially
offensive term and then use inclusion of that term in the
agreement to claim that the licensor misused its copyright.
This seems particularly problematic under the current
copyright misuse regime, where such a finding is likely to
enable the licensee to use the copyrighted material without
providing any recompense to the copyright holder (at least for
the period of misuse).
Id. Judge does note that the Napster court hinted that such "artificially
manufacture[d] overreaching clauses" might be a defense to misuse. Id. at 940
n.153 (citing In re Napster, Inc. Copyright Litig., 191 F. Supp. 2d 1087, 1107
n.16 (N.D. Cal. 2002)).
237. See Judge, supra note 154, at 940 (arguing that a negotiated bargain
should be a mitigating consideration in the determination of misuse).
238. See Julie E. Cohen, Copyright and the Perfect Curve, 53 VAND. L. REv.
1799, 1811 (2000) (discussing the potential imbalance of power that may exist).
But see Kobak, A Sensible Doctrine of Misuse, supra note 6, at 45 (noting that a
deal might not result from coercion but from "mutual convenience, business
exigencies, or other reasons").
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sufficient market power exists such that an antitrust claim could be
brought. Further, because copyright law, unlike patent law, allows
independent reverse engineering, defendants should be able to
create their own competitive products that compete with the
licensor's.239 Finally, it is unlikely that such market power would
actually exist.24°
2. Pricediscrimination
Owners of intellectual property may wish to engage in price
discrimination, that is, to charge different prices to different
buyers. 4 Price discrimination occurs in everyday life in that it
costs more to buy an airline ticket at the last minute than it does
well in advance.242 Price discrimination can be beneficial for the
market because it allows sellers to give discounts to those who
243
need them and should eventually simulate a competitive market.

239. See infra notes 303-07 and accompanying text.
240. See supra note 71 (quoting Judge Posner in Saturday Evening Post as
noting that the "danger of monopoly" in copyright law is less than in patent
law).
241. CHISUM ETAL., supra note 199, at 1084.
242. Id.
243. Id. (citing F. Scott Kieff, Property Rights and Property Rules for
Commercializing Inventions, 85 MINN. L. REV. 697, 727-32 (2001)); see also
John A. Rothchild, Economic Analysis of Technological Protection Measures,
84 OR. L. REV. 489, 506 (2005). Professor Rothchild described the effects of
price discrimination:
By charging different users different prices for the same good
based on how highly each user values the good, a publisher
can broaden access to the good by charging a lower price to
lower-valuing users. Price discrimination can succeed only if
the publisher can prevent arbitrage, which occurs when a
lower-valuing user resells a good to a higher-valuing user. A
tethering [technological protection measure] can prevent
arbitrage by making an information good useless except when
used by the original purchaser.
Id.; see also id. at 491 n.4 (citing Tom W. Bell, Fair Use vs. Fared Use: The
Impact ofAutomated Rights Management on Copyright's Fair Use Doctrine, 76
N.C. L. REV. 557, 591 (1998) ("Absent proof of a very narrow category of
circumstances, such as duress or misrepresentation, we can assume that
contracts under fared use reflect the interests of those who choose to enter into
them.")).
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Further, it provides access to works to more members of the public
at prices they can afford to pay and maximizes the profitability for
the copyright holder. 2" Certainly, there are commentators who
argue that price discrimination does not actually provide these
benefits.245 But as one author notes, the public benefits most when
more works are created, which (arguably) requires incentives for
authors.246

Some types of allegedly anticompetitive licenses may also be
viewed as price discrimination.247 For example, as discussed by
one author, tying arrangements are a form of price discrimination
as they "reach[] purchasers at prices closer to each purchaser's true
reservation price. 248 If price discrimination in the form of licenses
is considered beneficial, 24 9 and not necessarily violative of the
copyright grant, then such licenses should be allowed. We permit
244. See William W. Fisher III, Property and Contract on the Internet, 73
CHI-KENT L. REv. 1203, 1237-40 (1998) (discussing the various benefits of
price discrimination both for the copyright holder and the user).
245. See generally Cohen, supra note 238.
246. Alan L. Durham, Consumer Modification of Copyrighted Works, 81
IND. L.J. 851, 903 n.391 (2006). Durham offers his argument about the
potential benefits of price discrimination to society:
Note that price discrimination, in this or any case, facilitates
wealth transfer from consumers to producers. If author A
could charge each viewer according to exactly how much that
viewer desires his film, A's profits would be maximized by
eliminating consumer surplus-the value of the product for
consumers in excess of what they are required to pay. If
copyright law exists for the benefit of the public, one might
wonder about interpretations of the law that impoverish
consumers. Nevertheless, it is intellectual benefit that the
public should reap, through the advancement of knowledge.
Hence, directing resources toward the development of the
most highly valued works of authorship may be more
important than protecting consumers' bank accounts.
Id.
247. CHISUM ET AL., supra note 199, at 1084 (noting that anticompetitive
behavior may "be viewed through a rosier lens").
248. Kobak, A Sensible Doctrine of Misuse, supra note 6, at 29 (discussing
the Chicago school of economics approach to patent monopolies).
249. See Fisher, supra note 244, at 1239 (arguing that "price discrimination
leads to substantial improvements in distributive justice-better approximation
of the ideal of affording all persons access to works of the intellect").
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol17/iss2/2
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price discrimination to occur in many instances. It is inconsistent
to allow a practice in one realm yet punish those with intellectual
property protection who attempt to create the same pricing models.
Copyright misuse creates misaligned incentives and invites
infringers onto the scene. Further, as currently applied, it grants
uninjured parties the standing to assert the defense and requires a
copyright holder to make a difficult ex ante determination of its
actual rights-with a grave penalty for error. For the reasons
discussed above, courts should not recognize copyright misuse as a
defense to infringement. But how should courts treat those who
try to extend their intellectual property powers beyond those
granted by statute? The next Part offers the proposal that causes of
action that already exist will account for these violations and thus,
we need not create a new defense for these defendants to use.
IV. ALTERNATIVES TO COPYRIGHT MISUSE
Certainly, it is against public policy for a copyright owner to use
its copyright in a way that violates other laws or is anticompetitive.
But we should also be wary of promoting remedies that create a
dual punishment. There are various legal doctrines and financial
forces that should protect the public from anticipated harms
without the need for a misuse defense, including antitrust,2 5 civil
causes of action,"' fair use,252 and market economic forces. 53 This
Part discusses these alternatives and argues that together they
preclude the need for another body of law, particularly one with
the disadvantages discussed in Part III.
A. Antitrust Law
As discussed above, antitrust law typically covers conduct
including tying arrangements, blanket licenses, and tie-outs.254 The
antitrust doctrine examines whether a contract or practice is
anticompetitive with respect to downstream competitors or
250.
251.
252.
253.
254.

See infra notes 254-71 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 272-80 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 281-96 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 297-307 and accompanying text.
See supra Part II.B.(i).
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distributors.255 The focus is typically on "1) whether the restraints
control prices; and 2) whether the restraints are unilaterally
'
imposed or are the product of an agreement."256
To prove a
violation of antitrust generally requires a showing of market
power. 2115 Once this violation is proven, the
remedy is typically
258
treble damages or perhaps injunctive relief.
Antitrust law and copyright misuse often cover the same types
of behavior.259 Recall that a significant portion of misuse cases are
brought pursuant to antitrust-like claims. As a result of this
overlap, an injured party may recover twice from a copyright
holder when asserting antitrust and misuse. While antitrust is an
affirmative claim and misuse is merely a "shield," against a claim
of infringement, it is possible for a defendant to win both claims.26°
One might argue that the claims do not cover exactly the same
territory because copyright misuse does not require proof of
market power. But that should indicate something-if a copyright
holder does not have market power, it likely cannot force licensees
into bad deals that overreach its copyrights. That is, a copyright
holder without substantial market presence cannot effectively
compel others into "bad" deals. Potential licensees will simply
walk away.
Some argue that because antitrust and copyright misuse are
directed at different policy concerns, each is a valid method of
recovery for a claimant. 26 ' For example, Professor Meurer notes
255. Meurer, supra note 94, at 1886 (contending that because this focus does
not apply in most copyright cases, misuse is needed to fill in the gaps).
256. Lemley, supra note 137, at 1605 (also noting that patent law uses
similar considerations).
257. Gevurtz, supra note 171, at 372.
258. Lemley, supra note 137, at 1607 (citing P. AREEDA & L. KAPLOW,
ANTITRUST ANALYSIS 184-85 (1987)).
259. See Georgenson, supra note 38, at 319 ("The effect of copyright misuse
on purely business interests is within the realm of antitrust law, not the public
policy analysis of a misuse claim."); see also Lemley, supra note 137, at 1617
(noting that patent misuse and antitrust often apply to the same conduct).
260. See CHISUM ET AL., supra note 199, at 1104 ("To be sure, the aggressive
party who wins, or think [sic] she will win, a misuse defense as a shield may be
tempted to turn around and use the same as a sword in an antitrust matter
because antitrust causes of action may provide access to fee shifting and
damages.").
261. See Scher, supra note 20, at 98 ("Antitrust law deals with economic
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol17/iss2/2
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that intellectual property laws typically regulate vertical restraints
more harshly than antitrust laws do.262 Thus, he argues that we
need both remedies for different situations, although in some cases
both sets of doctrines may apply. 263 But it is precisely this double
recovery that makes the overlap impermissible."
Putting a
different gloss on the reasoning behind certain laws should not
give a claimant the opportunity to obtain more money.
Further, another scholar has argued that both antitrust and
misuse are needed because antitrust actions are "notoriously slow,"
the remedies are harsh, perhaps unduly, and "threaten to severely
diminish the incentive structure in place to promote 'the useful
arts." 2 65 Additionally, this author offers that the misuse doctrine is
beneficial because courts can use it in a discretionary fashion,
applying it where needed to protect competition. 26 6 But such a
discretionary approach, while potentially protecting some rights of
licensees, harms the rights of copyright owners who are without
bright-line standards. When this happens, copyright owners may
lose the incentive to innovate. If companies cannot be fairly
certain that they can protect their investments, they may simply
chose another protection method or another business altogether.267
Or, copyright holders might instead protect their works with trade
secrets, hiding the information from the public. 268 Further, at least
injury to the free marketplace resulting from monopoly control. Misuse, on the
other hand, prevents patent (and copyright) owners from exploiting rights
belonging to the public. Consequently, the antitrust and misuse doctrines must
be properly distinguished from one another.") (citations omitted).
262. Meurer, supra note 94, at 1911 (noting that IP regulations are stricter
than antitrust because the cases are smaller and less expensive, the remedies are
varied rather than relying solely on money damages, and there is a greater
concern for the consumer end user).
263. See id. at 1872.
264. Lemley, supra note 137, at 1617.
265. Chip Patterson, Note, Copyright Misuse and Modified Copyleft: New
Solutions to the Challenges of Internet Standardization,98 MICH. L. REV. 1351,
1367-69 (2000).
266. Id. at 1373-74 (promoting a balancing approach that takes into account
copyright holders' rights and the social welfare).
267. See Jere M. Webb & Laurence A. Locke, IntellectualPropertyMisuses:
Developments in the Misuse Doctrine, 4 HARV. J. L. & TECH. 257, 263-64
(1991) (discussing the criticisms of misuse).
268. Cf Clifford, supra note 70, at 285-86 (discussing the use of the misuse
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in the context of DMCA claims, one author disagrees with this
assessment:
Furthermore, defenses to [DMCA] claims should
not be shrouded in comparatively poorly
understood doctrines such as the copyright misuse
doctrine, but instead should be argued clearly as a
matter of applicable commercial and antitrust law
and policy. In particular, counterclaims in antitrust
law may be more easily pleaded and adjudicated
than copyright misuse defenses that raise similar
policy issues, but arguably in more oblique and
uncertain ways."'
Finally, there exist cases which may not rise to the level of
antitrust violations, but which are anticompetitive or stretch the
boundaries of the copyright holder's rights. Proponents of
copyright misuse consider these to be the most significant cases,27°
but these cases need further examination. First, if a license or
other conduct does not violate antitrust law, implicitly it is not
harming competition in any impermissible way. Thus, recovery on
that basis is not warranted. Proponents argue that the copyright
owner is misusing the copyright in a way that was not intended by
the intellectual property grant. 27 ' But that begs the question of why
defense to guard against plaintiffs who attempt to protect something under both
copyright and trade secret law). But nothing prevents a company from
protecting its software only as a trade secret, thereby denying the public the
benefit of its knowledge. For example, one court noted:
Finally, copyright law, and the misuse doctrine in particular,
should not be interpreted to require Disney, if it licenses its
trailers for display on any web sites but its own, to do so
willy-nilly regardless of the content displayed with its
copyrighted works. Indeed such an application of the misuse
doctrine would likely decrease the public's access to Disney's
works because it might as a result refuse to license at all
online display of its works.
Video Pipeline, Inc. v. Buena Vista Home Entm't, Inc., 342 F.3d 191, 206 (3d
Cir. 2003).
269. Lipton, supra note 135, at 491.
270. See Scher, supra note 20, at 97-101.
271. See id. at 104-05 (detailing his "scope of the grant test" which proposes
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol17/iss2/2
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that copyright owner would be successful in an infringement suit
in the first place. There may be some legitimate questions as to
what licensees should be permitted to contract away, as discussed
above, but generally, if that right is not addressed by the license,
the copyright owner will lose on the merits. For example, because
a copyright does not give the owner the right to prevent others
from independently developing competing software, barring a
license provision addressing it, the owner will simply lose if it sues
that competitor for infringement. Thus, the alleged infringer does
not need copyright misuse as a shield.
Antitrust law will address claims damaging the marketplace.
Copyright infringement law will protect copyrights, but will also
protect rights outside the bounds of the grant. Thus, copyright
misuse is cumulative and unnecessary.
B. Other Civil Causes of Action
Further, in many cases, litigation pursued solely for the purpose
of harassing a competitor or seeking settlement money can be dealt
with in other areas. For example, a defendant can later bring a
claim for wrongful use of civil proceedings or abuse of process.
Wrongful use of civil proceedings, also known as malicious
prosecution in many jurisdictions for similar acts in the criminal
context, provides relief to a defendant who was sued by a plaintiff
who lacked probable cause. The particular elements required to
prove a claim vary by state, but generally require that the plaintiff
brought an action without probable cause or with gross negligence,
and that the proceeding was terminated in the defendant's favor.272
Further, although wrongful use of civil proceedings is a state law
tort claim, it may apply to a case in which the wrongful suit at

a finding of copyright misuse against any plaintiff who has tried to go beyond
what the copyright actually grants it).
272. See, e.g., City of Coatesville v. Jarvis, 902 A.2d 1249, 1251 (Pa. Super.
Ct. 2006) (discussing the elements of the Dragonetti Act, Pennsylvania's
wrongful use of civil proceedings law); Anderson Dev. Co. v. Tobias, 116 P.3d
323, 340-41 (Utah 2005) (noting Utah's requirement that a claim be initiated
without probable cause and for a purpose other than "securing proper
adjudication of a claim" and that the defendant won the prior proceeding);
Palmer Dev. Co. v. Gordon, 723 A.2d 881, 883 (Me. 1999).
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issue was adjudicated in federal court.2 73 Thus, the claim may be
brought by a defendant who succeeds in a copyright infringement
suit.
Abuse of process involves "the use of legal process, whether
criminal or civil, against another primarily to accomplish a
purpose for which it was not designed. ' 274 Thus, even while the
plaintiff may technically prevail on its claim, if it misuses the suit
to achieve a goal other than enforcing its rights, it is abusing the
litigation process. 75 Such civil causes of action can assist a
defendant wrongly accused of copyright infringement.276 Indeed,
Judge Posner recognized this opportunity:
The argument for applying copyright misuse
beyond the bounds of antitrust . . . is that for a
copyright owner to use an infringement suit to
obtain property protection ...that copyright law
clearly does not confer, hoping to force a settlement
or even achieve an outright victory over an
273. Mattel, Inc. v. Luce, Forward, Hamilton & Scripps, 121 Cal. Rptr. 2d
794, 798 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002); Werner v. Plater-Zyberk, 799 A.2d 776, 791-93
(Pa. Super. Ct. 2002) (holding that a claim for malicious prosecution may be
brought in state court even for an original federal lawsuit since nothing creates
federal jurisdiction and the claim is not preempted by federal law); Toll Bros. v.
Gen. Accident Ins. Co., No. C.A. 98C-09-203 WTQ, 1999 WL 744426, at *8
(Del. Super. Ct. Aug. 4, 1999).
274. Hunter v. City of Des Moines Mun. Hous. Auth., No. 05-0375, 2006
WL 2692591, at *6 (Iowa App. Sept. 26, 2006) (quoting Fuller v. Local Union
No. 106, 567 N.W.2d 419, 421 (Iowa 1997)).
275. But see Judge, supra note 154, at 927-30 (noting that "an abuse of
process approach to misuse would often result in a good outcome," but also
arguing that misuse is more direct).
276. For example, in one case, the defendant accused of infringement
asserted misuse on the basis that the infringement suit itself was brought solely
to harass the defendant. Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Lerma, No. 95-1107-A, 1996
WL 633131, at *11 (E.D. Va. Oct. 4, 1996). The defendant ultimately lost the
claim of misuse, but the assertion illustrates the potential for an abuse of process
claim to provide relief. See also Int'l Motor Contest Ass'n v. Staley, 434 F.
Supp. 2d 650, 667 n.8 (N.D. Iowa 2006) (noting that the defendants' misuse
claim rested partly on a claim that the plaintiff brought the suit "not for any
proper purpose of protecting its copyrights, but to harass, oppress, and damage
the defendants" and accepting that this might be grounds for a finding of
misuse).
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol17/iss2/2
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opponent that may lack the resources or the legal
sophistication to resist effectively, is an abuse of
process.277
Thus, where a copyright holder sues a licensee for infringement
and it is using the suit only to coerce settlement or frighten the
licensee, the licensee should have relief through these tort actions.
One common justification for copyright misuse is that it is an
affirmative defense that may be raised by a claimant being sued for
copyright infringement.2 78 Critics believe that because misuse is
simply a shield rather than a sword, it is not overreaching in its
Conversely, abuse of process and malicious
remedies.279
prosecution are torts that must be alleged in separate lawsuits.
Further, at least for wrongful use of civil proceedings, the tort
plaintiff must have won his case as the defendant in the original
infringement suit. 8 Thus, if the defendant is truly infringing,
these tort causes of action are unavailable.
But where a defendant is truly infringing and the plaintiffs
conduct is not an antitrust violation, the defendant should not have
the right to cancel the copyright. It therefore seems appropriate
that a defendant who wins an infringement suit may have a claim,
while one who loses may not then sue the plaintiff. Additionally,
abuse of process claims apply even where the defendant does not
prevail. Therefore, these claims will assist a defendant being
harassed or improperly brought into court.
C. FairUse
As noted above, for users who are not truly violating the
copyright, misuse is not needed because the copyright holder will
One such way to defend an
simply lose on the merits. 8

277. Assessment Techs. of Wis., LLC v. WIREdata, Inc., 350 F.3d 640, 647
(7th Cir. 2003) (emphasis added).
278. See, e.g., Scher, supra note 20, at 97.
279. Ekstrand, supra note 50, at 577 (citing Dennis S. Karjala, Copyright
Protection of OperatingSoftware, Copyright Misuse, and Antitrust, 9 CORNELL
J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 161, 185 (1999)).
280. See supra note 272 and accompanying text.
281. See supra Part IV.A.
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infringement action using a doctrine already in place is by
claiming fair use. Fair use provides users some opportunity to
work with a copyrighted piece, without being liable for
infringement.282
Courts assess the totality of the circumstances in determining
whether a use is a fair use and consider at least four factors: the
character of the use; the nature of the copyrighted work; the
amount of the copying; and the effect of the use on the market for
the copyrighted work.283 Initially, fair use applied primarily when
the use at issue was for news, criticism, or scholarly purposes.284
However, courts have also characterized the intermediate copying
needed for reverse engineering as fair use.285
Thus, fair use presents licensees with a defense, one already
widely recognized, to guard against overreaching by copyright
holders. 286 The most promising fair use factor for software
licensees is the second factor-the nature of the copyrighted
work.287 Most computer programs have little original material and
much of the code will constitute ideas or scenes a faire.288 Only

282. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2000); Georgenson, supra note 38, at 297 ("Under
certain circumstances, activities that constitute infringement actually further the
purposes of copyright law and, therefore, are permitted under the Copyright
Act.").
283. 17 U.S.C. § 107; see also Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation
Enters., 471 U.S. 539 (1985) (applying the four factors). For further discussions
of the fair use defense, see Pierre N. Leval, Toward a Fair Use Standard, 103
HARV. L. REv. 1105 (1990).
284. See Alan L. Durham, ConsumerModification of Copyrighted Works, 81
IND. L.J. 851, 853 (2006) (citing 17 U.S.C. § 107).
285. Georgenson, supra note 38, at 298 (discussing Atari Games Corp. v.
Nintendo of America, 975 F.2d 832 (Fed. Cir. 1992) and Sega EnterprisesLtd.
v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510 (9th Cir. 1992)).
286. See Meurer, supra note 94, at 1902 (noting that limitations by owners of
copyrights in computer software are "significantly constrained by ... the fair
use doctrine" in what types of limits they can place on things like independent
development and adaptation).
287. 17 U.S.C. § 107(2).
288. Donna L. Lee, Reverse Engineering of Computer Programs Under the
DMCA: Recognizing a "FairAccess" Defense, 10 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L.
REv. 537, 544 n.27 (2006) ("Under the scenes a faire doctrine, expressions that
are standard to a given genre or style lack the necessary originality for copyright
protection.").
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original material is protected
computer programs have thin
should cut against a copyright
over its work. Unfortunately,

259

via copyright, 289 and thus, many
protection. 29" This thin protection
holder trying to claim tight control
the second factor rarely carries the

day for a defendant asserting fair use. 291' Therefore, these licensees
will need to win the other factors as well. Analysis of fair use
cases shows that often, the court finds that all four factors point in
the direction of one of the parties. Thus, where the second factor
favors the defendant, it should likely also be able to show fair use

overall.
One counter argument to this assertion that fair use will solve
the problem is that due to the vague standards of fair use,
copyright holders who are big businesses can attempt to frighten
legitimate fair users into ceasing use.292 Fair use has not provided
uniform, consistent decisions that give copyright holders and users
helpful information. 93 Thus, users with potentially fair uses may
289. See Apple Computer, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 35 F.3d 1435, 1443 (9th
Cir. 1994) ("Because only those elements of a work that are protectable and
used without the author's permission can be compared when it comes to the
ultimate question of illicit copying, we use analytic dissection to determine the
scope of copyright protection before works are considered 'as a whole."').
290. See Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 349 (1991)
(discussing the "thin" protection available where a work is lacking in
originality); Rod Dixon, When Efforts to Conceal May Actually Reveal:
Whether First Amendment Protection of Encryption Source Code and the Open
Source Movement Support Re-Drawing the Constitutional Line Between the
First Amendment and Copyright, 1 COLUM. Sci. & TECH. L. REv. 1, 1 (2000)
(advocating thin protection for computer software).
291. See Crews, supra note 221 (finding that courts usually find fair use
based on the first and the fourth fair use factors).
292. Jason Mazzone, Copyfraud, 81 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1026, 1049 (2006).
Professor Mazzone defines copyfraud as "claiming falsely a copyright in a
public domain work." Id. at 1028. He proposes that courts should expand
misuse to fight publishers who inflict copyfraud on the public. Id. at 1087-90.
293. See Andrew Inesi, A Theory of De Minimis and a Proposalfor Its
Application in Copyright, 21 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 945, 982 (2006) (calling fair
use "'the most troublesome' doctrine in copyright") (quoting Dellar v. Samuel
Inesi offers these
Goldwyn, Inc., 104 F.2d 661, 662 (2d Cir. 1939)).
observations on fair use:
Courts have interpreted each of the four statutory fair use
factors in strikingly different ways, and there is no clear
guidance regarding how to balance the four factors against
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be hesitant to test the waters and risk liability or costly litigation.
Powerful copyright owners may send cease and desist letters that
bully licensees into retreating for fear of civil action.2 94 But this is
a consideration in any area of litigation. If the boundaries were
clear, parties would know what to do and would not resort to
courts. Thus, cleaning up the consistency of the fair use defense
itself will address the root cause of the problem.2 " Adding another
inherently subjective defense, copyright misuse, merely muddies
the waters. 96
D. Market Forces
Finally, allowing the market to essentially force unfairly
competitive behavior from the marketplace is another way to
police overreaching by copyright holders. Typically, where one
producer charges a price above what consumers are willing to pay,
those consumers will look for an alternative product. The
manufacturer charging the higher price is forced to decide whether
to lower prices to lure back its consumers.297
one another. Further, the fair use statute explicitly permits
consideration of factors other than the four statutory factors,
but provides little guidance regarding what those other factors
should be or how important they are. Therefore, courts are
able to use fair use as a way to justify almost any refusal to
apply copyright. Indeed, empirical evidence suggests that
courts' fair use analyses are driven by their ultimate fair use
holdings, not vice-versa.
Id. (citations omitted).
294. Ekstrand, supra note 50, at 565-66 (discussing the display of hundreds
of such letters from copyright owners on www.chillingeffects.org).
295. See Bell, supra note 243, at 578-79 ("Fair use will thus continue to play
a vital role, albeit a diminished one, in a world of otherwise pervasive fared use.
Contracts that interfere with the fair use defense might risk federal
preemption.").
296. See Cotter, supra note 185, at 540 ("The other alternative would be to
discard misuse altogether and to rely instead on a properly reformulated fair use
or preemption doctrine, or simply to hold offending contractual provisions
unenforceable as a matter of public policy.").
297. Cf Rothchild, supra note 243, at 530-31. Of course, as Rothchild
notes, this is true only in a perfectly competitive market involving fungible
goods. Id. Most markets in this software area, however, are either monopolies
or oligopolies. Id. at 530. There, "[t]he lack of close substitutes gives the seller
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Thus, using typical economic analysis, we can predict that as

consumers (or licensees) become dissatisfied with contract terms
demanded by copyright holders, they will simply look elsewhere
for the good.2 98 For example, one scholar analyzed this process
with respect to technological protection measures such as those
called for by the DMCA.299 Professor Rothchild noted that while
these copyright holders might face less pressure from consumers
than in a perfectly competitive market, consumer preferences
would still force these holders to respond.3 "'

market power: it can raise price above marginal cost without seeing sales go to
zero (as would occur in the case of pure competition)." Id. at 532. In an
oligopoly, the existence of few sellers and the high barriers to market entry
make prices sticky around some central number and it is more difficult for
consumers to find cheaper alternative goods. Id. at 541.
298. The "substitution effect" refers to situations where consumers shift
preferences from one good to another based on pricing or other characteristic.
See e.g., Dennis S. Karjala, Congestion Externalities and Extended Copyright
Protection, 94 GEO. L.J. 1065, 1072 (2006) (describing, in the context of the
Copyright Term Extension Act, a potential substitution effect where consumers,
tired of Mickey Mouse, change their preferences for some other work or
character); Matthew Sag, Piracy: Twelve-Year Olds, Grandmothers, and Other
Good Targetsfor the Recording Industry, 4 Nw. J. TECH. & INT. PROP. 133, 136
(2006) (describing the substitution effect that results when consumers use peer
to peer file sharing in place of buying CDs).
299. Rothchild, supra note 243.
300. Rothchild explained his findings:
The proposed model of publisher decision making, together
with the anecdotal evidence offered by the case studies,
suggests that profit-maximizing publishers that face
competition have meaningful incentives to be responsive to
consumer [technological protection measure] preferences.
Publishers in markets that are monopolistic, monopolistically
competitive, or oligopolistic face correspondingly less
pressure from such consumer preferences than do publishers
in competitive markets.
Id. at 561; see also Pamela Samuelson, Intellectual Property and the Digital
Economy: Why the Anti-Circumvention Regulations Need to Be Revised, 14
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 519, 566 (1999) (discussing the probability that if one
copyright owner restricts access too much, consumers will switch to other
options and noting that "[i]n addition, if consumers won't buy tightly restricted
copies, copyright owners may end up worse off than before"). This suggests
that the market itself can force copyright owners to stay within the bounds of
acceptable copyright policies.

Published by Digital Commons@DePaul, 2016

55

DePaul Journal of Art, Technology & Intellectual Property Law, Vol. 17, Iss. 2 [2016], Art. 2

262

DEPAULJ.ART& ENT LAW

[Vol. XVII:207

Certainly, where a copyright holder has a particular monopoly
on a product such as computer software, this substitution may not
occur. Consumers who refuse to purchase software tied to some
other product may not have other options to substitute. This would
allow the copyright holder to extend its monopoly without fear of
consumer abandonment. But if this is true, the copyright holder
Thus, an injured
seemingly has significant market power.
competitor could presumably at least attempt an antitrust suit.
Moreover, as discussed above, copyright holders do not
necessarily hold the same exclusivity rights as their analogous
patent holders."' Whereas patent holders have essentially absolute
exclusivity, copyright holders are subject to the independent
creation of a competing work by another.3"2 Thus, although it
might take some time, presumably where consumers are
dissatisfied with the available licenses, new businesses will start
up in response and will create alternative works.
Copyright law also permits reverse engineering where a
competitor can attempt to create the copyright holder's product.3 3
Critics often bemoan the slow process and large capital outlay
necessary for reverse engineering." Yet, it is just such capital
outlay that at least somewhat justifies giving copyrights in the first
place. Of course, we do not reward "sweat equity,"3 5 but where
that sweat produces something original, it is rewarded in order to
301. See Sharon Billington, Relieffrom Online Used Book Sales During New
Book Launches, 29 COLUM. J. L. & ARTs 497, 512 (2006) (discussing the
differences in exclusivity between patent and copyright and noting the proffered
justification of higher capital outlay and shorter terms for patent procurement).
302. See Jay Rubin, Television Formats: Caught in the Abyss of the
Idea/Expression Dichotomy, 16 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J.

661, 676 n.87 (reviewing that patents protect ideas while copyrights protect only
expression) (citing Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 217 (1954)).
303. Georgenson, supra note 38, at 292 ("Through [reverse engineering],
computer programmers 'disassemble' the program to determine how it
functions. The programmers then use the information they discover during that
process to develop new programs which render their products compatible.").
304. See, e.g., id. at 297 (noting that reverse engineering "is not a simple or
foolproof task" and that it "can be costly and time consuming, even when
compared to independent development"); Patterson, supra note 265, at 1375-76
(arguing that the reverse engineering response to misuse ignores the fact that
such processes take time which is certainly of the essence in software cases).
305. See Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340 (1991).
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incentivize future creations." 6
Therefore, copyrights should
protect against free riding by infringers.
Where a copyright holder persuades a licensee to contract away
the right to reverse engineer its product, certainly, independently
creating a competitive product will not be an option.0 7 But as
noted above, that is the licensee's choice when it makes the
contract decision. If it is an informed bargain, it should be upheld.
Thus, for some licensees, reverse engineering will still be an
option.
Further, where such behavior is truly egregious, perhaps courts
can simply void the contract at issue. This is a lighter penalty than
copyright misuse as it does not void the entire copyright, nor other
licenses that use similar terms. But the court might decide that
using common-law contract principles, the contract is
unconscionable or otherwise invalid.
V. CONCLUSION

It is difficult to predict where copyright misuse is heading in the
future. Scholars seem anxious to apply it broadly, but courts,
while paying lip service to its proffered rationale, seem less willing
to pull the trigger. If copyright misuse is so beneficial to the
public good, why have courts proceeded so tentatively?
Patent misuse began with wide-sweeping application and
consequences. Initially, patentees routinely found their patents
unenforceable due to a tying arrangement or another antitrust-like
violation.3 8 Slowly but surely, courts and Congress have been
backing away from this harsh remedy.3 9 But even as this occurs,
copyright scholars and software licensees have been pushing
306. See Bell, supra note 243, at 582 ("Lawmakers enacted the Copyright
Act to cure an alleged case of market failure: creating a work can cost authors a
good deal, whereas copying a work costs free riders very little."). Bell candidly
points out that scholars who lament the expansion of copyright owners' power
are biased in that they benefit from fair use in disseminating their own and other
scholarly works, and they are not personally licensing anything and thus, are not
in danger of losing any fees. Id. at 618.
307. This was the case in Lasercomb. See Lasercomb Am., Inc. v. Reynolds,
911 F.2d 970 (4th Cir. 1990).
308. See infra notes 26-38 and accompanying text.
309. See infra notes 39-50 and accompanying text.
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copyright misuse to the forefront. From its early recognition in a
blanket licensing scheme to its revival by the Lasercomb court,
copyright misuse seems to be gaining popularity.3 1
There are numerous reasons why copyright misuse is not a valid
defense and should be eliminated. It provides absurd incentives
for potential infringers"' and creates standing where none existed
before.3 12 Further, the scope of copyright protection is inherently
subjective and it is overly burdensome to punish copyright holders
for good-faith attempts at enforcing their rights." 3 Additionally,
while patents and copyrights have some similarities, they are
sufficiently distinct such that their remedies do not always overlap
smoothly.3" 4
Finally, we should enforce contracts that were
bargained-for exchanges with due consideration.3" 5
Without copyright misuse, we can still protect licensees from
companies trying to exert power with regard to software with very
thin copyright protection. First, antitrust laws should provide
relief to licensees who are dealing with copyright holders asserting
market power unfairly.1 6 Further, actions like wrongful use of
civil proceedings and abuse of power or copyright defenses like
fair use will protect legitimate users.317 Finally, simple market
economics should force copyright holders to charge competitive
prices and use fair terms or their consumers will switch to
competitors' products.31 8 Thus, a defendant who is not infringing
does not need copyright misuse to win, and a defendant who is
infringing should not get to use it.
There is much writing in the academy about the ever-increasing
scope of the copyright power, including its term length. 19 Critics
argue that those who truly need the protections that copyright
offers are not receiving it.320 But simply hacking away at the
310.
311.
312.
313.
314.
315.
316.
317.
318.
319.
320.

See infra notes 57-82 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 147-68 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 169-86 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 187-203 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 204-23 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 224-49 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 254-71 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 272-96 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 297-307 and accompanying text.
See generally Patry & Posner, supra note 198.
S~verine Dusollier, The Master's Tools v. The Master's House:
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licenses which are the products of copyrights is trying to apply a
bandage rather than fix the root cause. To truly solve the issues
identified by scholars, we must overhaul the copyright system and
seriously question which works get copyright protection-and how
much. However, once those owners have protections that they are
relying on, it is inappropriate to yank them away.

Creative Commons v. Copyright, 29 COLUM. J. L. & ARTS 271, 289 (2006).
Dusollier notes:
The copyright legislation of today too often leaves authors
without any legal protection against the economic pressures of
intermediaries (e.g., publishers or producers). The emphasis
that policy-makers increasingly place on the economic
interests of the copyright industry not only harms the users of
copyrighted works, but also prejudices the individual creators
who will gradually cease to see copyright as a right that exists
to protect them.
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